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Many Canadians are currently exposed to adverse environmental impacts on a regular 
basis, often from activities that have received government authorization. There has been a 
recent push from mainstream and political actors to incorporate environmental rights into 
the Canadian legal system to address this issue. Two proposed methods include the 
enactment of an Environmental Bill of Rights and an amendment to the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter) to constitutionalize an explicit right to a 
healthy environment. However, there are limitations to both of these approaches. A 
statutory Bill of Rights does not have the teeth of constitutional rights, and an amendment 
to the Constitution is, due to the strict amendment requirements provided in subsection 
38(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, at best a long-term goal. 
 
Section 7 of the Charter – the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right 
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice 
– is another option. The case law on section 7 indicates that serious health risks can cause 
physical deprivations of security of the person. However, there is legal uncertainty in 
relation to how specific environmental harms may intersect with the security of the 
person and how these deprivations would violate the principles of fundamental justice. 
 
This thesis concludes that section 7 can apply when the substance of a claim relates to the 
environment. Specifically, the case law demonstrates that the best argument available for 
section 7 is that procedural fairness, as a principle of fundamental justice, requires 
governments to provide specific procedural protections when regulatory approvals pose 
substantial health risks that interfere with affected individuals’ rights to security of the 
person. Such approval processes must meet the minimum requirements of procedural 
fairness when section 7 rights are at stake: notice, participation, and the provision of 
reasons. Further, the rule of law and the rule against arbitrariness require that final 
decisions about those projects be made rationally. Decisions must reflect the purpose of 
the legislation that grants power to the decision-makers, and take into account any 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
I: Environmental rights in Canada 
Canadian constitutional law has not yet been interpreted in a way that recognizes a 
relationship between the environment and human rights. There is no legislated national 
right to a healthy, clean, or safe environment, nor a right to a certain degree of 
environmental protection. Numerous studies have shown that Canada lags behind most 
other wealthy nations in terms of environmental protection and performance, and that 
there is an “urgent need” to improve.1 Decreased quality of air and fresh water, climate 
change, and the destruction of biodiversity are serious environmental issues that have 
been inadequately addressed by Canadian governments and, partly due to a lack of 
explicit environmental rights, the government is under no legal obligation to take action.2 
Recognizing environmental rights may be a way to impose such an obligation.  
The idea of establishing environmental rights in Canada has recently caught 
political and mainstream attention. At the time of this paper, private member’s Bill C-
634, An Act to Establish a Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights, had just passed its first 
reading at the House of Commons.3 The effect of the Act would be to legally enshrine 
environmental rights for Canadians and impose a duty upon the federal government to 
take action to protect the environment. Citizens would be able to seek recourse in the 
Federal Court for an action against the Government of Canada for “violating the right to a 
                                                
1 David R Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment: Revitalizing Canada's Constitution (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2012) at 4-9. 
2 Boyd, supra note 1. 
3 Bill C-634, An Act to Establish and Environmental Bill of Rights, 2nd Session, 41st Parliament, 62-63 
Elizabeth II, 2013-2014 [Bill C-634]. 
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healthy and ecologically balanced environment.”4 Nevertheless, even in the unlikely 
event that the bill passes, there are limitations. First, it is a federal bill, meaning it would 
only apply to actions within the power of the federal government. According to s. 91 of 
the Constitution Act, 1867,5 this includes issues related to fisheries and oceans, cross-
border pipelines, navigation and shipping, airports, and interprovincial transportation. 
Powers exclusively within the jurisdiction of the provinces, however, such as mining, 
forestry, electrical energy, non-renewable resources, property, and generally all matters 
of a local or private nature within the provinces would not be affected by the legislation.6 
Second, the rights within the bill would be statutory rights, not constitutional.  In the 
words of David Boyd, the author of what is arguably the most substantial body of work 
on environmental rights in Canada, the difference between statutory rights and 
constitutional rights is like “lions and housecats – related, but with dramatically 
difference degrees of strength.”7 Statutory rights may provide options to individuals 
whose rights have been violated, but do not guarantee a particular outcome. In contrast, 
the constitution is the “supreme law”8 of Canada, and any law or government action that 
violates the rights protected within it will be found to be of no force or effect. In short, 
statutory rights may interfere, but only constitutional rights can bind the hands of 
government.  
A final limitation of Bill C-634 is that it is unlikely that the rights contained 
within it would apply retroactively. Thus, while the bill may be useful for moving 
                                                
4 Bill C-634, supra note 3 at ss. 17(c). 
5 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5, [Constitution Act, 
1867]. 
6 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 5 at s. 92 & 92A(1). 
7 David Boyd, quoted in Megan Bradfield, “Making Sense of the Proposed Canadian Bill of Rights”, 
Ecojustice, October 30, 2014 (online at: http://www.ecojustice.ca/blog/making-sense-of-the-proposed-
canadian-environmental-bill-of-rights). 
8 Constitution Act 1867, s 52(1). 
 3 
forward, its protections may not be applicable to projects currently underway, or be 
available to individuals who have already suffered harm due to adverse environmental 
impacts. 
There has been a recent renewed push from environmental activists to 
constitutionalize environmental rights, and it has been proposed that the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms ought be applicable in the environmental context. 9 The 
Charter is part of the Constitution and provides the highest level of protection for human 
rights in Canada. The Charter supplies a set of “uniform national standards for the 
protection of [a set of] civil liberties [that are] regarded as so important that they should 
receive immunity, or at least special protection, from state action.”10 Boyd identifies three 
potential methods for connecting the Charter to the environment. His first choice is 
through a direct constitutional amendment. The most prominent advocate for this 
approach is David Suzuki with his 2014 “Blue Dot Tour”, which was largely based on 
Boyd’s work. At the heart of the tour is an advocacy for a constitutional amendment to 
explicitly entrench environmental rights within the Charter. Suzuki explains that 
constitutionalization is necessary because “one-off victories against industrial projects, 
like Site C. Dam or Northern Gateway, will not stop the march of economics towards 
further environmental harms to our climate, water, and soil.”11 If successful, Canadians 
would be able to challenge otherwise lawful government actions in the environmental 
                                                
9 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, [Charter].  
10 Peter W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed Vol 2 (Scarborough, Ontario: Thomson Carswell 
Limited, 2007) at 29-30.  
11 David Suzuki, quoted by the Vancouver Observer (online at: www.vancouverobserver.com/news/david-
suzuki-launches-blue-dot-tour-hoping-alter-canadas-constitution). 
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sector on the basis that the resulting environmental impacts violate their constitutionally 
protected rights.  
There is a strong argument that amending the Charter to include environmental 
rights is unlikely for several reasons.12 For one, Charter amendments require high levels 
of consensus among decision-makers.13 Section 38 provides that in order for a general 
amendment to pass, the amendment must be authorized by “the Senate, the House of 
Commons, and a two-thirds majority of the provincial legislative assemblies that have, in 
the aggregate, at least fifty per cent of the population of all the provinces.”14 This means 
that 7 of the 10 provinces must agree to the amendment, which is difficult threshold to 
meet. According to Andrew Gage, while entrenchment “can be expected to appeal to… 
idealists and environmental enthusiasts, it would be surprising if [it] were to be given 
majority support.”15  
The second approach to constitutionalization identified by Boyd is through a 
judicial reference.16 Judicial reference is done by “persuading either Ottawa or a 
provincial/territorial government to ask the courts whether Canada’s constitution already 
includes an implicit right to a healthy environment.”17 While the courts are, as the name 
of the approach suggests, involved in this process, judicial reference is different from 
litigation in that the issue is not a direct challenge to a particular action. Rather, the courts 
                                                
12 See: Boyd, supra note 1, at chapter 8; Dale Gibson, “Environmental Protection and Enhancement Under 
a New Canadian Constitution" in Stanley M Beck & Ivan Bernier, eds, Canada and the New Constitution: 
The Unfinished Agenda (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1983) 115, at 126; Colin P 
Stevenson “A New Perspective on Environmental Rights After the Charter” (1983) 21 Osgoode Hall LJ 
390 at 420, states that the “political and economic climate is not conducive” to the enactment of a 
constitutional environmental right. 
13 Stevenson, supra note 12, at 401. 
14 Charter, supra note 9. 
15 Andrew Gage, "Public Health Hazards and Section 7 of the Charter" (2003) 13 J Envtl L & Prac 1 at 126. 
16 Boyd, supra note 1 at 185. 
17 Boyd, supra note 1 at 171. 
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are asked to provide an opinion as to what the likely outcome would be if an issue came 
before them. However, there are problems with judicial reference as approach to 
constitutional environmental rights as well. Because they are not based on actual events, 
judicial references are, while highly persuasive, not binding. Also, like entrenchment, 
judicial reference is dependent on government initiative. Finally, the approach asks 
judges to read a very broadly conceived environmental right – into the Constitution. This 
risks a serious infringement of the separation of powers, an issue further discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
A third option is through section 7 of the Charter. Unlike the second option 
above, the intent here is not to ask the courts to read into the Charter a broad, substantive 
right to a clean environment, but to extend the reach of section 7 to include 
environmental harms. According to Hamish Stewart, this provision is a “very powerful 
tool for the protection of rights through litigation rather than through legislative action.”18 
Section 7 provides that “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person 
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice.” Its purpose is to limit government powers to prevent negative 
impacts on an individual’s “most basic interests”19 – life, liberty, and security of the 
person – and to provide recourse for those whose rights have been infringed by 
government actions. Stewart notes that section 7 provides the strongest tool available in 
the Canadian legal system for challenging government action. It has, according to 
Stewart, 
opened up grounds for challenging state action that would otherwise have been 
immune to review on [other] constitutional or administrative grounds. Some of 
                                                
18 Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012), at 19. 
19 Stewart, supra note 18 at 18. 
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the Court’s most dramatic interventions in Canadian law – its invalidation of the 
abortion prohibition in the Criminal Code, its constitutionalization of basic 
principles in criminal law, its foray into health care policy – were made possible 
by the power to review laws for compliance with the substantive principles of 
fundamental justice… Thus, perhaps more than any other section of the Charter, 
section 7 has increased the law-making power of the courts.20 
 
There are four major parts to the section 7 legal framework. First, an impugned 
government action must be identified to trigger the Charter under subsection 32(1) and 
give rise to a claim. Second, the plaintiff must establish standing to bring a Charter 
claim, either as an individual or in the public interest. Third, there must be a deprivation 
of life, liberty, or security of the person. There are two requirements for this third step: 1) 
a negative impact on the right, and 2) a sufficient causal connection between the negative 
impact and the impugned government action. Fourth, the infringement of the interest 
must be done in a manner that violates the principles of fundamental justice.  
A thorough analysis of how each of these parts of the section 7 analysis relates to 
the environment has not yet been done, neither in an academic nor in a courtroom setting. 
There have been suggestions regarding individual elements of the section 7 legal 
framework, but the pieces have not been put together into a complete argument.  
II: Thesis purpose and research questions  
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an analysis of how the section 7 legal framework 
applies in an environmental context. Four primary questions are addressed: what kind of 
conduct in the environmental sector may trigger the Charter, what types of plaintiffs are 
likely candidates for successful section 7 environmental claims, what facts are required to 
demonstrate that there has been an infringement of security of the person, and how may 
the infringement violate the principles of fundamental justice. 
                                                
20 Stewart, supra note 18 at 307-08. 
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The thesis contains a positivist (i.e., neutral) interpretation of environmental, 
administrative, and constitutional case law from all levels of Canadian courts to identify 
the elements of a section 7 claim, the accompanying legal tests, and the requirements for 
success at each step of the way. To be clear, the purpose of this work is to provide a 
descriptive legal option regarding the idea proposed by Boyd, Collins, and Gage: that 
individuals exposed to environmental harms may be able to bring a claim against the 
government through section 7. This piece is distinguishable from the works of Boyd 
Collins, and Gage as it not primarily a reformist or a prescriptive piece. The purpose here 
is not to advocate for a particular approach to interpreting section 7, or seek to influence 
public decision-makers.21 This has already been done. Rather, this thesis explores the 
unaddressed issue of whether or not Canadian case law actually upholds the proposition 
that section 7 can have an environmental application and, if so, what type of evidence a 
plaintiff must adduce in order to be successful. 
III: Research Method 
The research method followed in this work is a neutral (positive) legal analysis, with the 
purpose of providing an opinion regarding the likelihood of success if a question 
respecting the application of section 7 to environmental harms were to be argued before a 
court. This is done by analyzing the relevant sources of law, principally case law, and 
interpreting and applying the statements of law within those sources to hypothesized facts 
that raise the issue of section 7’s application to environmental harm in order to reach a 
legal opinion. In this case, the most applicable sources of law include cases from the 
Supreme Court of Canada and other lower-level courts addressing section 7 of the 
                                                
21 Edward L Rubin, “’Law and’ and the Methodology of Law” (1997) 521 Wis L Rev 521, at 547. 
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Charter, the need for environmental protection, and procedural fairness in both a 
constitutional and administrative law context. The analysis is supplemented with 
references to the legal literature on section 7. This research did not include a comparative 
law approach. While case law from other jurisdictions may provide insight into the 
interpretation of section 7, a full analysis of the approach to similar legal questions in 
other jurisdictions other is beyond the scope of this paper, which is intended to focus on 
the implications of Canadian section 7 jurisprudence for environmental rights. 
International law is relevant insofar as it has been used to inform section 7 analysis by 
Canadian courts, but again this paper does not independently examine the international 
human rights rules surrounding environmental rights. 
The general approach to legal research consists of three main phases: i) 
identifying the issue, ii) the library or research phase, and iii) application or analysis 
phase. These three steps and how they were employed for this thesis are discussed in 
greater detail in Appendix I. 
IV: Thesis outline 
There are six remaining chapters in this thesis. Chapter 2 provides the background 
information relevant to this discussion, including a review of relevant section 7 and 
environmental literature, as well as examples of relevant cases that have been brought 
before the courts in Canada. Chapter 3 contains an overview of case law containing 
judicial statements regarding the significance of environmental protection in Canada. 
Chapter 4 constitutes the bulk of this thesis, and sets out the legal framework for section 
7 and how that framework relates to the environment. Chapter 5 provides a sample 
application of the argument to environmental regulatory approval processes. Chapter 6 
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addresses some of the primary challenges that future plaintiffs will likely face when 
developing their arguments, and elaborates on the relationship between administrative 
and constitutional law that is introduced in Chapter 4. Chapter 7 concludes and provides 
suggestions for further research. 
Overall, it is concluded that section 7 can be successfully applied when the 
substance of a claim relates to the environment. Specifically, the case law demonstrates 
that the best argument available for section 7 is that procedural fairness, as a principle of 
fundamental justice, requires governments to provide certain procedural protections when 
regulatory approvals pose substantial health risks that interfere with affected individuals’ 
rights to security of the person.22 It appears likely that such approval processes require 
the minimum requirements of procedural fairness when section 7 rights are at stake: 
notice, participation, and the provision of reasons. Additionally, the rule of law and the 
rule against arbitrariness require that final decisions about those projects be made 
rationally. Decisions ought to reflect the purpose of the legislation that grants power to 
the decision-makers, and take into account any factually sound evidence – including 
scientific evidence – that is presented. 
 
  
                                                
22 Security of the person is the most applicable interest to this context, given that liberty is generally 
associated with risk of incarceration, and a risk to life requires a much higher burden of proof than a risk to 
security of the person. See: Stewart, supra note 18. 
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Chapter 2: Background 
Broaching section 7 and the environment 
As stated, the idea of applying section 7 to the environment has not been given a large 
amount of attention and, somewhat surprisingly, there is little academic work directly 
related to the application of the Charter to an environmental context. To date, it appears 
that only three legal scholars have explicitly discussed the approach: David Boyd, Lynda 
M. Collins, and Andrew Gage. Works both citing, and cited by, these authors were 
consulted, and online searches including key search terms such as Charter, security of the 
person, fundamental justice, and environment were performed to determine whether or 
not other scholars had written on this topic. Other relevant works were not found, 
indicating that the application of section 7 to the environment had not yet been answered 
elsewhere. 
Boyd proposes that the right to a healthy environment could be constitutionalized 
“through a lawsuit arguing that some specific form of ecological harm (such as air 
pollution) violates a right that is already explicitly protected by the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.”23 Specifically, he suggests that there may be an “implicit 
constitutional right to a healthy environment, most likely vis-a-vis section 7,”24 and that 
specific environmental harms ought to be capable of violating this right. For example, he 
argues that the “intrusive presence of harmful levels of toxic substances (such as mercury 
                                                
23 Boyd, supra note 1 at 176.  
24 Boyd, supra note 1 at 176.  
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or PCBs) in a person’s body could… be considered a violation of the right to a bodily 
integrity and therefore a potential violation of section 7.”25 
Collins advances an approach called an “ecologically literate reading of human 
rights laws.”26 She defines ecological literacy as “the basic understanding of the 
functioning of ecosystems, including the role that human beings play in the natural 
world”,27 and argues that it should be practiced when interpreting and applying all 
existing laws. Collins proposes that the right to a safe environment may already be a free-
standing human right under the Canadian common law, with one example being under 
section 7 of the Charter,28 and argues that state-sponsored environmental harm resulting 
in an increase in the risk of illness or death to an individual or community is likely a 
prima facie violation of section 7. While she suggests that this common law right may 
eventually give rise to substantive, statute-recognized entitlements – an argument that is 
beyond the scope of both Collins’ and this paper – she declares that “it is clear that, at a 
minimum, the right to environment should be used as an interpretive aid in construing 
existing provisions in Canadian constitutional… law.”29 Thus, her approach does not 
require any entrenchment of new rights through amendments or new legislation, but a 
broad recognition that existing rights, such as Charter rights, “may be violated through 
environmental harm, and must be protected from such harm.”30  
Gage looks at public rights under section 7 in his work. He contends that the 
scope of section 7 ought to extend to protecting members of the public against 
                                                
25 Boyd, supra note 1 178.  
26 Lynda M Collins, "An Ecologically Literate Reading of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms" (2009) 26 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 7 at 7. 
27 Collins, supra note 26at 7. 
28 Collins, supra note 27 at 20.  
29 Collins, supra note 27 at 20. 
30 Collins, supra note 27 at 10. 
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government decisions that expose individuals to serious public health risks, such as a 
toxic environment.31 He argues that section 7 is “sufficiently broad to protect against 
general threats to public health, not-withstanding the public nature of such a right.”32  
While Boyd, Collins, and Gage each suggest there could be a positive role for 
section 7 in addressing environmental harms, none of their work contains a 
comprehensive legal analysis of the requirements for a section 7 claim or sets out 
precisely how such requirements might apply in an environmental context. The majority 
of Boyd’s work, for example, is in relation to the entrenchment of environmental rights 
into the Charter. Given that section 7 is not a large focus of his work, his analysis of the 
application of the provision to environmental rights is understandably incomplete. He 
provides a brief overview of the steps involved in a section 7 claim, but does not identify 
or apply the legal tests for each step. Significantly, his work lacks an analysis of the 
principles of fundamental justice, a major element of section 7. More substantially, it 
does not seem plausible that a favourable ruling for an environmental section 7 applicant 
can have the sort of far-reaching impact on environmental governance in Canada that he 
envisions throughout his work.  
The pith of Gage’s work is the development of collective rights and a 
consideration of whether the application of the Charter extends beyond the individual 
and can be triggered by a risk to the public at large. The crux of his argument is not on 
bridging the gaps between section 7 and the environment, but on extending the scope of 
section 7 beyond the individual and into the realm of public health. There are also three 
elements missing from his analysis of section 7. First, like Boyd, he does not 
                                                
31 Gage, supra note 15 at 1.  
32 Gage, supra note 15 at 2. 
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comprehensively identify nor apply the legal tests for establishing an infringement of 
section 7. Second, while he proposes that a prohibition against posing serious health risks 
to the public ought to be a principle of fundamental justice in itself, he provides no 
analysis of how the current state of the common law supports this proposition. Finally, he 
does not address the existing court-identified substantive principles of fundamental 
justice and, given that his work takes a public law focus, how they may apply in an 
environmental context.  
Collins’ work provides what is arguably the most complete work on section 7 in 
the environmental context. However, there are also elements missing from her analysis. 
Primarily, her discussion of triggering section 7 does not discuss the legal tests for 
establishing physical and psychological breaches of security of the person and the type of 
evidence might be required in order to fulfill the requirements of these tests. In addition, 
her discussion of the principles of fundamental justice does not mention two major 
substantive principles that have been identified by the Court: the rules against 
overbreadth and vagueness. While these principles are not necessarily the best avenues 
for success, they remain important components of section 7 jurisprudence and require 
attention. 
A key topic that is lacking across the literature is a discussion of the law 
governing procedural fairness as a constituent part of section 7. It is unclear in the 
literature how the rules of administrative law, judicial review of administrative decision-
making processes, and the common law tests regarding the content of the duty of fairness 
may assist in expanding section 7 to the environmental context. Given that most potential 
section 7 claims relating to the environment will be connected to some sort of 
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administrative decision-making process, the role of procedural fairness warrants a 
thorough exploration.  Further, the issue of causation and how it might be established in 
the environmental context is not fully addressed, and discussions on the applicable 
principles of fundamental justice are sparse. The omission of these issues in the literature 
may be attributable to the fact that three leading section 7 cases – Insite, Bedford, and, 
most recently, Carter – containing in-depth descriptions of substantive principles of 
fundamental justice were released after the works of Boyd, Collins, and Gage had been 
written.33  However, the SCC explicitly sets out a test for recognizing and establishing 
‘new’ principles of fundamental justice in Malmo-Levine, to which Collins, Boyd and 
Gage make no reference.34   
There is a final similar component among Collins’, Boyd’s, and Gage’s analyses 
that separate their work from the analysis in this thesis. Their works are each primarily 
reform pieces, actively promoting the idea of implementing constitutional protection 
against state-sponsored environmental harms. The authors do not provide a neutral legal 
opinion on whether or not the approaches advocated for will actually be successful in 
front of a court of law. Thus, while use of section 7 for environmental purposes has been 
thrice identified as a worthwhile goal, a clear roadmap to (potential) success has not yet 
been drawn..  
Section 7 on the ground: types of cases going forward 
Outside of the literature, more and more individuals have demonstrated interests in 
pursuing section 7 claims of their own. Boyd provides an overview of the earlier 
unsuccessful cases where applicants sought to engage section 7 rights in furtherance of 
                                                
33 Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [Carter]. 
34 R v Malmo-Levine; R v Caine, 2003 SCC 74, [2003] 3 SCR 571, [Malmo-Levine]. 
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environmental protection.35 Despite the lack of success for these plaintiffs, a look these 
and other recent cases shows that the environmental legal landscape continues to push 
Canadians into bringing rights-based environmental claims. 
Take, for instance, a case called Kelly v. Alberta.36 The plaintiffs in Kelly are 
residents of a community situated within a few kilometers of proposed sour gas wells in 
Alberta. In 2008, the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board conditionally approved the 
construction of two wells in an area with a “higher than normal density of rural 
residential homes and farms,”37 despite evidence demonstrating an above average risk of 
serious health effects to the nearby residents. The plaintiffs appealed the authorization to 
the Alberta Court of Appeal on the grounds that the Board “acted without jurisdiction and 
erred in law by requiring residents to voluntarily relocate or continue to live in their 
homes exposed to an unacceptable risk during the drilling and completion of the wells.”38 
Interestingly, the Court noted that the Board’s “finding of fact… gave rise to [a] section 7 
argument… [and that] it is at least arguable that the Applicants should be entitled to 
mount an argument on appeal that section 7 may now be invoked and that an 
infringement be made out”.39 The finding of fact was that the plaintiffs would be exposed 
to an “unacceptable” level of harm due to exposure to H2S, a gas which is life 
threatening at very low concentrations, and, should the gas escape and ignite, to S02, 
which is also a hazardous substance, should the project move forward. Fortunately for the 
plaintiffs, the project was ultimately abandoned. However, there are inevitably many 
others facing circumstances similar to those the Kellys and their neighbours faced, and, 
                                                
35 For a review of the full list of unsuccessful cases, see David Boyd, supra note 1 at Chapter 8. 
36 Kelly v Alberta, 2008 ABCA 52 (2008), 34 CELR (3d) 4, [Kelly]. 
37 Kelly, supra note 36 at para 15. 
38 Kelly, supra note 36 at para 15. 
39 Kelly, supra note 36 at para 17. 
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because this case did not proceed, it is unclear how the section 7 argument would have 
played out.  
 The construction of wind turbine generation farms across Southern Ontario has 
been the source of anguish for many families living close to the structures.40 Scotty and 
Jennifer Dixon, Scott and Tricia Drennan, and Ken and Sharon Kroeplin were concerned 
about the negative effects associated with industrial wind operations, including “sleep 
disturbance, stress, headaches, nausea, and tinnitus”.41 The Director of the Ministry of the 
Environment issued renewable energy approvals to several wind turbines farms under the 
Environmental Protection Act.42 The plaintiffs argued that the government’s 
authorization of the construction of the wind turbines essentially allowed the alleged 
health risks to “come into their neighbourhoods.”43 The process for issuing the approvals 
did not require the Director to solicit public participation or consultation, meaning that 
the plaintiffs’ concerns were not heard or taken into consideration before the 
authorization was granted. The plaintiffs recently argued in front of the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice that the approval process violated their section 7 rights in relation to how 
serious impacts to human health were considered. However, the plaintiffs faced fatal 
evidentiary problems as they were unable to adduce any expert evidence corroborating 
their personal claims of health risks, and thus the approval process was not found to 
expose the plaintiffs to an infringement of security of the person. The claim was 
ultimately unsuccessful, and wind turbines continue to pop up across the province. 
                                                
40 See, for example, Health Canada, Wind Turbine Noise and Health Study [July 2012] Environmental And 
Workplace Health < http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ewh-semt/noise-bruit/turbine-eoliennes/index-eng.php>. 
41 Dixon v Ontario (Director, Ministry of the Environment), 2014 ONSC 7404 at para 14, [Dixon]. 
42 Environmental Protection Act, RSO 1990, c E-19 [EPA]. 
43 Dixon, supra note 41. 
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An ongoing case involves Ronald Plain and Ada Lockridge of the Aamjiwnaag 
First Nation.44 These individuals seek judicial review of a decision of the Ministry of the 
Environment to approve air pollutant releases “absent an assessment and minimization of 
the cumulative effects of pollution”45 in Sarnia, Ontario. Sarnia is an industrial 
municipality. The municipality is better known as “Chemical Valley” due to the 
numerous “refineries, petrochemical facilities, and other heavy industries” present there, 
the emissions of which have left Sarnia with the worst air quality in Canada.46 The 
reserve lands of the Aanishnaabek people are located within several kilometers of Sarnia, 
and the applicants allege that the increase in air pollutants – including sulfur dioxide – 
resulting from the approval will contribute to the already-existing serious risks to their 
mental and physical health and well-being, and thus infringes their rights to life, liberty, 
and security of the person.47 Specifically, the plaintiffs refer to health surveys that 
demonstrate that “residents of Aamjiwnaag are suffering numerous health impacts, 
including high rates of asthma (22% of children and 17% of adults, which is well above 
the Ontario and national average), birth defects, miscarriages and stillbirths, skin rashes, 
chronic headaches, high blood pressure, cancers, and skewed birth ratios.48 Not only are 
the locals suffering from these physical impacts, but they have also “lost a great deal of 
                                                
44 Court file No. 528/10, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, between Ada Lockridge and Ronald Plain –and- 
Director, Ministry of the Environment, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, (Amended) Notice of 
Application to Divisional Court for Judicial Review (January 10, 2012) [Lockridge and Plain]. See also: 
Collins 2013, ibid at 82, ref to P Hamilton, ‘Sarnia Takes Title for Worst Air in Canada’ [2011] Ecojustice 
<http://www. ecojustice.ca/blog/sarnia-takes-title-for-worst-air-in-canada> accessed 15 July 2012. 
45 Lockridge and Plain, supra note 44 at 4-5. 
46 Lynda M Collins, “Security of the person, peace of mind: a precautionary approach to environmental 
uncertainty” (2013) 4:1 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 79 at 82 (Collins 2013). 
47 Lockridge and Plain, supra note 44 at 3. 
48 Lockridge and Plain, supra note 44 at 14. 
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personal autonomy and control over their health and well-being as a result of the 
pollution.”49 At the time of this paper, the case had yet to be heard before a court. 
 In summary, the idea of applying section 7 to the environment is not a new one. In 
scholarship, section 7 has been proposed as a potential venue for pursing substantive 
environmental rights, as a way for influencing the interpretation of human rights, and as a 
way to prevent public health risks. However, section 7 in an explicit environmental 
context has yet to be rigorously explored and no arguments in front of a court of law have 
been successful to date. Thus, the potential for section 7 for bringing change to the 
Canadian environmental legal landscape is unclear. The purpose of the remainder of this 
thesis is to provide clarity on this issue.  
  
                                                
49 Lockridge and Plain, supra note 44 at 14. 
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Chapter 3: Words from the judiciary on the environment 
 
Judges have been turning their minds to the need for and value of environmental 
protection for several decades. Boyd points this out, noting that courts have 
a strong track record in environmental cases [and have] explicitly referred to the 
right to a safe environment in several cases. [Also, they] frequently [rely] on 
international and comparative law… in interpreting the Charter, and both of these 
sources of law support recognition of an implicit right to a healthy environment. 
[Finally], the court describes the constitution as a “living tree” and emphasizes the 
need to interpret the document progressively over time to meet changing 
circumstances.50 
 
Indeed, case law and literature demonstrate that policy arguments related to the merits of 
environmental protection have been taken into consideration by several courts across 
Canada and, not insignificantly, many of these comments have come from decisions of 
the Supreme Court of Canada. This chapter provides an overview of cases from the SCC 
that discuss the importance of environmental protection, as well as lower-level courts 
from other jurisdictions that have relied upon these statements in their own judgments. 
The cases selected for discussion in this section were either originally identified by Boyd 
or Collins as being important cases for the development of an environmental ethic among 
the courts, or were found by noting up those cases to find additional cases reflecting the 
sentiments of the SCC regarding the environment.  
As early as 1978, the SCC took note of the harms associated with pollution. In 
Sault Ste Marie, the defendant – the City of Sault Ste Marie – was charged with polluting 
contrary to the Ontario Water Resources Commission Act by disposing of refuse from the 
city into a creek.51 The Court held that when the issue is a public welfare offence, as was 
                                                
50 Boyd, supra note 1 at 181. 
51 R v Sault Ste Marie (City), [1978] 2 SCR 1299, [Sault Ste Marie], ref to Ontario Water Resources 
Commission Act, RSO 1970, c 332. 
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the case here, the Crown should not have to demonstrate wrongful intention of the 
defendant in order to establish that the offence had been committed. As stated by Dickson 
J., “[the] prevention of pollution of lakes, rivers and streams… is of great public 
concern… Natural streams which formerly afforded “pure and healthy” water for 
drinking or swimming purposes become little more than cesspools when riparian factory 
owners and municipal corporations discharge into them filth of all descriptions.”52 Sault 
Ste Marie established a new standard of criminal liability in order to deal with negligence 
of directors and officers, and has become a landmark in criminal negligence law.  The 
fact that the need for adequate pollution control merited a fundamental shift to a 
prominent area of law speaks to the Court’s recognition of the importance of 
environmental protected. 
Ten years later, in Crown Zellerbach, the SCC found that the control of marine 
pollution was a “matter of concern to Canada as a whole”,53 and was important enough to 
trigger the constitutional doctrine of national concern. In this case, the challenge was in 
regards to a provision in the federal Ocean Dumping Control Act that prohibited the 
dumping of any substance at sea except in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
federally authorized permits.54 The plaintiff charged with dumping argued that the 
provision was unconstitutional on the grounds that the prohibition permitted the federal 
government to act outside of its constitutionally imposed jurisdiction. The Court 
disagreed, explaining that the issue addressed by the legislation – marine protection – was 
                                                
52 Sault Ste Marie, supra note 51. 
53 R v Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd, [1988] 1 SCR 401, [1988] SCJ No 23, at para 37. 
54 Ocean Dumping Control Act, SC 1974-75-76, c 55 at s 4(1). 
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important enough for the federal government to be able to interfere under the doctrine of 
peace, order, and good government as a matter of national concern.55  
In Sparrow, a member of the Musqueam Indian Band was found to have an 
aboriginal right to fish with a drift net.56 However, he was only able to exercise this right 
to fish to the extent that it did not interfere with conservation measures. The SCC ruled 
that environmental concerns in fisheries management must be given priority over 
constitutionally protected Aboriginal rights because, according to the Court, the 
“justification of conservation and resource management… is surely uncontroversial.”57  
In the opening statement of Oldman River, La Forest J. states that “the protection 
of the environment has become one of the major challenges of our time.”58 The appellant 
environmental group sought to compel the federal Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to 
require the province of Alberta to prepare and submit for federal review an environmental 
assessment for the construction of a dam on the Oldman River by the province of Alberta. 
The appellants argued that an environmental assessment was mandatory for compliance 
with the federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order. 
Ultimately the Court’s decision came down to questions of jurisdiction regarding the 
Order, not the province’s environmental obligations and the Minister was not required to 
implement and comply with the Order. However, La Forest J. provides some helpful 
obiter, stating that, “surely the potential consequences for a community’s livelihood, 
                                                
55 In Attorney-General for Ontario v Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] AC 193, Lord Watson 
explained that the national concern doctrine, as a branch of peace, order, and good government provided for 
in s. 91 of the Constitution, supra note 5 allows the federal government to interfere with matters that have, 
since the enactment of the Constitution in 1867 have ceased to be merely local or provincial, and have 
become matters of national concern. 
56 R v Sparrow, [1990 1 SCR 1075, [1990] SCJ No 49, (SCC) [Sparrow]. 
57 Sparrow, supra note 56 para 73. 
58 Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 SCR 3 at para 95, 
[1992] SCJ No 1, (SCC), [Oldman River] at para 1. 
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health, and other social matters from environmental change are integral to a decision-
making on matters affecting environmental quality.”59 He takes note of the explicit 
connection between impacts to the environment and human health, a necessary 
component of an environmental application of section 7. 
In 1995, the SCC released Canadian Pacific.60 This case arguably contains some 
of the most influential judicial statements in support of environmental protection 
initiatives in Canada. Here, the respondent was charged under section s. 13(1)(a) of 
Ontario’s Environmental Protection Act, which prohibits pollution “of the natural 
environment for any use that can be made of it.” The respondent was responsible for 
uncontrolled burns, which resulted in dense smoke escaping onto his neighbours’ 
properties. The respondent appealed the charges, claiming that the prohibition was vague 
and overbroad and violated his rights to section 7. The majority of the Court upheld the 
impugned section of the Act, despite recognizing its potentially broad application, 
because “the objective of environmental protection is ambitious in scope [and the] 
legislature is justified in choosing equally ambitious means for achieving this 
objective.”61 Gonthier J., quoting a statement by the Law Reform Commission of Canada, 
writes that “environmental protection has emerged as a fundamental value in Canadian 
society [and that the] right to a safe environment [is a] fundamental and widely shared 
value [that is] seriously contravened by some environmental pollution… It is increasingly 
understood that certain forms and degrees of environmental pollution can directly or 
indirectly, sooner or later, seriously harm or endanger human life and human health.”62 
                                                
59 Oldman River, supra note 58 at para 39. 
60 Ontario v Canadian Pacific Ltd, [1995] 2 SCR 1031, [1995] SCJ No 62 (SCC), [Canadian Pacific].  
61 Canadian Pacific, supra note 60 at para 55. 
62 Ibid. 
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Everyone, according to the Court, is “aware that individually and collectively, we are 
responsible for preserving the natural environment.”63 
In Hydro-Quebec, the SCC held that environmental protection is of 
“superordinate importance.”64 Similar to the issue in Canadian Pacific, the court ruled 
that the need for environmental protection was significant enough to support broadly 
worded legislation.65 In this case, the accused had released polychlorinated biphenyls 
(PCBs) into a body of water and was charged under the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act for releasing a toxic substance into the environment.66 The accused 
claimed that the criminal prohibition was unconstitutionally broad, specifically the terms 
“toxic substance” and “environment”. Further, environmental matters were not, according 
to the defendant, criminal matters and thus the Act was ultra vires the criminal power of 
the federal government under s. 91 of the Constitution. La Forest J., speaking for the 
majority, disagreed. The Court upheld the provision and reasoned that the protection of 
the environment “constitutes a wholly legitimate public objective in the exercise of 
criminal power.” La Forest J. expressed concerns over allocating legislative power over 
the environment exclusively to the provinces in a manner that “prevented Parliament 
from exercising… its role in protecting the basic values of Canadians regarding the 
environment.”67 Further, Lamer C.J., although writing in dissent, nonetheless shared La 
Forest J.’s concern for the protection of the environment and stated that environmental 
protection is “one of the major challenges of out time.”68 Thus, while the 5-4 split in 
                                                
63 Ibid. 
64 R v Hydro-Quebec, [1997] 3 SCR 213 at para 85, [1997] SCJ No 76, La Forest J, [Hydro-Quebec]. 
65 Hydro-Quebec, supra note 64 at para 123. 
66 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, RSC 1985, c 16 (4th Supp), at s. 67. 
67 Hydro-Quebec, supra note 64 at para 154. 
68 Hydro-Quebec, supra note 64 at para 61, Lamer CJ. 
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Hydro-Quebec almost dismissed key provisions a leading piece of legislation providing 
for environmental protection in Canada, a concern noted by Boyd, both the majority and 
dissenting judgments actually reinforce the significance of effective environmental 
governance.  
The Newfoundland Supreme Court – Court of Appeal has also commented on the 
urgency for improved environmental stewardship. In Labrador Inuit Association, the 
plaintiff Association appealed a decision of the Minister of Environment and Labour 
where a proposed road and airstrip were deemed to be separate undertakings from a 
proposed mining development for the purposes of environmental assessment.69  Due to 
the relatively small size of these undertakings, this decision would relieve the 
development of both the road and airstrip from the environmental assessment process for 
the mining project altogether. The Court overturned the Minister’s decision, ruling that 
the road and airstrip were not separate works, but part of the overall mining project and 
were to be incorporated into the environmental assessment. In both the opening and 
closing sections of the judgment, the Court stressed that reconciliation of the use of 
resources with environmental protection and preservation is, quoting La Forest J., “one of 
the major challenges of our time.”70 In recent years, according to the Court, society has 
been “left to grapple with the deleterious, and at times tragic, effects of unbridled 
development on the health and security of its residents and upon the environment”, and 
noted that as “the harmful effects of Amazonian deforestation; of damage to the ozone 
                                                
69 Labrador Inuit Assn v Newfoundland (Minister of Environment and Labour), [1997] NJ No 223 at paras 
3 & 83, 152 DLR (4th) 50, 25 CELR (NS) 232 (NLCA), [Labrador Inuit Association]. 
70 Labrador Inuit Association, supra note 69 at paras 3 & 83, ref to Oldman River, supra note 58 at 16-17. 
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lawyer; and, of acid rain become increasingly apparent, the urgency of controlling the 
destruction of the earth’s environment is brought home.”71  
In Spraytech, the plaintiffs challenged the Town of Hudson’s jurisdiction to create 
regulations about the use of pesticides.72 This case was sparked by citizens’ concerns 
with alleged health risks caused by non-essential uses of pesticides within town limits. 
The SCC stated that “our common future, that of every Canadian community, depends on 
a healthy environment”.73 The Court upheld the by-law, reasoning that environmental 
governance is complicated and the municipality was not acting outside of its powers. 
However, the merits of the municipality’s actions and the effects of the pesticides on the 
environment and the health of Hudson’s citizens were not related to the issue of 
jurisdiction, and thus it is unclear whether or not these considerations would be taken into 
account for a final decision had the issue been on point. 
In Canfor, the SCC explains that the value of the environment extends beyond its 
“economic value,”74 and asserts that environmental protection is a “fundamental value in 
Canadian society.”75 In this case, the province of British Columbia sought damages from 
Canadian Forests for the valuation of trees that were burnt in a forest fire. Lebel J. stated 
that the trees had “intrinsic value at least equal to their commercial value, despite their 
non-commercial use.”76 Crown counsel only plead that its entitlement was that of the 
landowner of a tract of forest, and thus the Court limited its analysis to those claims 
regarding compensation for commercial value. It is unclear, then, whether and how the 
                                                
71 Labrador Inuit Association, supra note 69 at paras 5-6. 
72 114957 Canada LtEe (Spraytech, Societe d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40, [2001] SCJ No 
42, [Spraytech]. 
73 Spraytech, supra note 72 at para 1. 
74 British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd, 2004 SCC 38, [2004] 2 SCR 74, [Canfor], at paras 
63-84. 
75 Canfor, supra note 74 at para 217. 
76 Canfor, supra note 74 at para 157. 
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Court would have granted damages aside from commercial value, and what a remedy 
related to the intrinsic value of the environment might look like. That said, what is clear 
from this case is that the Court was willing to hear and accept arguments related to the 
intrinsic value of the environment. 
Each of these cases demonstrates that Canadian courts have not shied away from 
integrating environmental values into decision-making processes. Indeed, members of the 
judiciary across Canada have relied upon these values to expand upon levels of criminal 
liability; to defend the implementation of the constitutional doctrine of national concern; 
to define the limits of constitutionally protected Aboriginal rights; to connect 
environmental impacts to human health; to uphold broadly worded legislation from all 
levels of government, including provincial environmental protection legislation, federal 
criminal prohibitions, and municipal by-laws; to interfere with administrative decisions; 
and to recognize the intrinsic value of natural landscapes. Courts have explicitly stated 
that there is a connection between human rights and the environment, and that this 
connection ought to inform environmental decision-making processes. While language 
supporting this connection has yet to be used in a section 7 context, the ongoing 
expansion of section 7 into novel circumstances in order to address the “changing 
circumstances” of society and the increased use of the section 7 language – ‘fundamental’ 
– in the environmental context demonstrates that courts may, in appropriate 
circumstances, be willing to hold that environmental impacts can cause unconstitutional 




Chapter 4: The section 7 legal framework 
There are several reasons for why Boyd, Gage, and Collins have identified section 7 as 
the most suitable provision for connecting human rights to environmental harms. As 
explained by Stewart, section 7  
has proved to be one of the most fertile, even protean, sections of the Charter, as 
its very general language has made it the source for numerous constitutional 
claims that might be difficult to assert under other sections of the Charter. … 
Some of the Court’s most dramatic interventions in Canadian law – its 
invalidation of the abortion prohibition in the Criminal Code, its 
constitutionalization of basic principles in criminal law, its foray into health care 
– were made possible by the power to review laws for compliance with [the] 
principles of fundamental justice. … Perhaps more than any other section of the 
Charter, section 7 has increased the law-making power of the courts.77  
 
Section 7, then, appears to be one of the most likely venues for substantially influencing 
the exercise of government authority when human rights are involved.  
This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the section 7 legal framework 
in an environmental context. Again, a rigorous analysis of this type has not yet been 
done. In this thesis, all cases from the SCC discussing section 7 and/or the environment 
were considered. Completeness was ensured through reading treatises prepared by 
leading section 7 scholars in Canada, and by noting up all SCC section 7 cases on 
LexisNexis and CanLii to take note of any development of the law.  
Because there are no analogous cases addressing both section 7 and the 
environment beyond the first three elements of the framework, several aspects of the 
legal opinion provided in this thesis rely on analogous reasoning. The overall likelihood 
of success of any argument will depend upon the specific circumstances of the case going 
forward. 
                                                
77 Stewart, supra note 18 at 307. 
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 The steps for a section 7 claim can be broken down into five parts. First, there 
must be a Charter-triggering government action. Second, a plaintiff must be able to 
establish standing. Third, there must be an infringement of the plaintiff’s security of the 
person. Fourth, the infringement must violate the principles of fundamental justice. A 
plaintiff who can complete these first four steps will have successfully demonstrated a 
breach of section 7. The government defendant may then attempt to defend the 
infringement under s. 1 of the Charter. 
Step 1: Section 32(1) – Matters within government authority 
Section 32(1) provides that the Charter applies “to the Parliament and government of 
Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters 
relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and… to the legislature and 
government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the 
legislature of each province.” The effect of subsection 32(1) is that every action taken by 
a government body – whether federal, provincial, or municipal – is subject to the 
Charter. Case law demonstrates that a wide range of conduct associated with government 
can satisfy the test for governmentality and constitute a “matter” for the purpose of 
subsection 32(1). While the provision applies to the entirety of the Charter, there are 
types of government action that are more suited to section 7 than others. Therefore, the 
types of actions discussed in this Chapter are limited to those actions that are most likely 
to come up in the environmental sector. 
For most of the 80’s, section 7 as one of the “legal rights”78 provided by the 
Charter was interpreted to apply only to government matters relating to the 
                                                
78 Ss. 7 – 14 of Part 1 of the Charter fall under the heading “Legal Rights”. 
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administration of justice. The administration of justice refers to “the state’s conduct in the 
course of enforcing and securing compliance with the law”,79 generally referring to 
criminal and quasi-criminal offences or procedures. Offences under the Criminal Code of 
Canada and criminal procedures were the most common matters to be challenged 
because, understandably, placing someone in prison has a serious impact on her or his 
personhood. An incarcerated individual has effectively been deprived of the right to 
liberty, and an individual subject to arrest in a public place, intense police interrogation, 
or a strip search suffers a violation of security of the person. Due to the risk of 
incarceration and the restrictions on liberty throughout the criminal process (even before 
a finding of guilt), both politicians and judges have long recognized that it is imperative 
that any such restrictions be done in a fair and transparent manner that is in compliance 
with the principles of fundamental justice. 
Since these early Charter days, the scope of s.7 has been interpreted more 
broadly. In both G(J) and Blencoe, the SCC confirmed that section 7 now applies beyond 
the criminal context and into other areas where state or state-sponsored actions have the 
potential to infringe life, liberty, or security of the person.80 Thus, if there has been a 
negative impact on a section 7 interest in a manner that is not in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice, the provision is triggered. It does not matter whether 
the breach occurred within criminal or quasi-criminal matters, the administration of 
justice, administrative proceedings, or otherwise. Given that most environmental 
                                                
79 New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G(J), [1999] 3 SCR 46 at para 65, 
(available on CanLII), [G(J)]. 
80 G(J), supra note 80; Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 
SCR 307, [Blencoe]. 
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challenges under section 7 are likely to arise outside the criminal context, the remainder 
of this section is devoted to identifying non-criminal Charter-triggering state conduct. 
Legislation is among the clearer examples of government conduct. Pieces of 
legislation –i.e. statutes and regulations – are enacted by federal and provincial 
legislatures. By-laws are also included, as by-laws are created by municipalities that are 
granted law-making power under provincial legislation. The SCC has held that municipal 
bodies are governmental in nature and all of their activities are subject to Charter 
review.81  
Case law demonstrates that various types of provisions in environmental 
legislation have been subject to attack. For example, in Energy Probe, a statutory 
limitation on personal liability for individuals involved in operations of nuclear plants 
under the Nuclear Liability Act triggered s. 32.82 In Locke and Millership, the 
authorization of hydrofluorosilicic acid (fluoride) to a public water supply through a 
municipal by-law and a provision in provincial legislation, respectively, were lawfully 
challenged.83   
While the scope of subsection 32(1) expands beyond what is contained in 
legislation, what actually constitutes a matter within government authority has not always 
been clear. La Forest J. addresses this issue in Godbout, and provides the test for 
identifying governmentality for the purposes of Charter application.84 In this case, the 
plaintiff, Michele Godbout, challenged the terms of a contract between the City of 
                                                
81 Locke v Calgary, [1993] AJ no 926 [QB] [Locke]; Godbout v Longueuil (Ville), [1997] 3 SCR 844 at 
para 47, 152 DLR (4th) 577, CRR (2d) 1, [Godbout]. 
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83 Locke, supra note 81; Millership et al v British Columbia et al, 2003 BCSC 82, [Millership]. 
84 Godbout, supra note 81 at para 47. 
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Longueuil and permanent employees of the City. The City had adopted a resolution that 
required all permanent employees to reside within city limits. If an employee were to 
move outside of city boundaries, that employee could be terminated immediately without 
notice. Godbout was offered a position as a radio operator for the city police force, and 
signed an agreement setting out the terms of employment, including the requirement to 
live within city limits. Her employment was terminated when she later moved to a 
neighbouring municipality and refused to move back to Longueuil. While the final 
decision of the SCC was rooted in s. 5 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms as opposed to section 7, La Forest J. (speaking for 3 of 6 judges) nevertheless 
discusses the Charter and explains that 
the ambit of s. 32 is wide enough to include all entities that are essentially 
governmental in nature and is not restricted merely to those that are formally part 
of the structure of the federal or provincial governments. [Furthermore], particular 
entities will be subject to Charter scrutiny in respect of certain governmental 
activities they perform, even if the entities themselves cannot accurately be 
described as ‘governmental’ per se… Rather, it is simply to say that where an 
entity can be accurately described as “governmental in nature”, it will be subject 
in its activities [including entering into private contracts] to Charter review.85 
 
Other types of conduct that may form the basis of environmental claims, as 
identified by Collins and Boyd, occur when governments are directly in charge of 
running industrial operations, such as waste management plants.86 Similarly, government 
may have made an investment is such a project, or authorized projects on Crown land.  
Decisions by bodies established by statute to administer government programs 
trigger the Charter. In Blencoe, the plaintiff was accused of sexual harassment by a co-
worker while serving as a minister in the Government of British Columbia.87 The 
                                                
85 Godbout, supra note 81 at para 47. 
86 Collins, supra note 27 at 17. 
87 Blencoe, supra note 80. 
 32 
complaints were filed with the British Columbia Human Rights Commission who 
conducted an investigation into the complaints. The Commission was established by 
statute and, while performed its operations independent from government, the Charter 
applied to the Commission’s investigatory process because its ultimate source of 
authority came from government under the Human Rights Code. 
Similarly, administrative decision-makers derive their powers from statutes, and 
thus are governmental in nature. Administrative decision-makers are distinct from the 
types of program-administrating bodies discussed above, as they act more like trial-level 
courts than providers of public services. Boyd, Collins, and Gage all identify permitting, 
licensing, or certifying conduct of private parties as conduct that triggers the Charter. 
According to Collins, ‘[w]here a government agency issues a license, permit, or 
certificate of approval specifically permitting a particular environmentally harmful 
emission, discharge, or course of conduct, there is no doubt that government action has 
occurred and the s. 32 requirement is met.”88 In Kuczerpa, for example, the failure of the 
Minister of Agriculture to refuse a registration of chemicals and formulations for 
pesticide use, which allegedly caused irreversible neurological damage, triggered the 
Charter.89 In Wier, the Charter-triggering conduct was a decision of the Environmental 
Appeal Board to issue a pesticide use permit to the Minister of Forests.90 In 
circumstances where a third party actor is the direct cause of the harm, there may still be 
sufficient connection to government for the action to be caught. For example, in Domke 
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and Kelly, the plaintiffs challenged the Energy and Utilities Board for granting licenses to 
construct sour gas wells to contracting companies.91  
Red Chris is a non-constitutional decision from the SCC, but nevertheless 
demonstrates a type of environmental administrative decision that could trigger the 
Charter. In this case, a mining company had submitted a project to the British Columbia 
Environmental Assessment Office regarding an open put mining and milling operation.92 
As part of the project, the company also submitted to the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans an application for dams required to create a tailings impoundment area, which 
was relevant to the mine and mill. The project was originally proposed by the proponent 
as to include the mine, mill, and tailings area, but the Department later re-scoped a 
project so as to exclude the mine and the mill. The re-scoping led to a significantly 
smaller environmental assessment process, as a comprehensive study was no longer 
required, and public comment was not sought. MiningWatch, the public interest plaintiff, 
filed an application for judicial review of the decision on the grounds that the responsible 
authority had failed to meet its obligations under the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act. Specifically, MiningWatch alleged that the defendant was required to 
undertake a comprehensive study. The SCC ruled in favour of MiningWatch, and held 
that responsible authorities for the purposes of environmental assessment cannot re-scope 
a project. Rather, the term “project” under the Act referred to the project as proposed by 
the proponent, not as scoped by the responsible authority. Therefore, the decision of the 
Department to re-scope the project violated the statutory requirements of Act. 
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In addition to decisions, the conduct of administrative decision-makers regarding 
decision-making responsibilities can also trigger the Charter. For example, the issue in 
Insite was that the Minister of Health did not grant an exemption to Insite, a safe injection 
site, from a criminal prohibition against the possession of narcotics.93  Interestingly, the 
Minister’s action was not in the form of a formal refusal. Rather his failure to address the 
request for an exemption, coupled with public comments about Insite, indicated, 
according to the SCC, that a decision had effectively been made and that was sufficient to 
trigger subsection 32(1). In Coalition of Citizens for a Charter Challenge, an alleged 
demonstration of bias within a solid waste management process for the City of Halifax 
formed the basis of a Charter claim.94  
Distinguishing conduct of government vs. non-government actors 
What constitutes a matter within the authority of government for Charter purposes is not 
always clear. Sometimes there may be a governmental presence to an issue, yet the 
Charter may not apply.  
Conduct purely of private parties is not subject to the Charter. For example, if the 
polluting activity of a company arises from the company’s private conduct and not from 
government-sanctioned acts, then the Charter will not be triggered. In order for an entity 
to be subject to the Charter, there must be a “sufficient element of control”95 by 
government. For example, statute-created tribunals, municipalities, and provincial and 
federal Ministries are examples of entities that are “governmental in nature” to which the 
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Charter applies.96  Every action taken by these types of entities is subject to review by 
the courts. In contrast, universities, hospitals, and other types of private bodies are not 
necessarily subject to the Charter, even if they receive government funding, provide 
public functions, and work “closely with the government to achieve [their] objectives.”97 
Stewart explains that if the “’routine or regular control’ of the institution does not 
lie in the government’s hands but in the hands of an independent board,”98 then the 
Charter will not likely apply. That said, courts have held that these entities, although not 
governmental in nature, may perform certain governmental functions that are subject to 
the Charter. While the Charter may not catch all conduct, certain actions may be. Given 
that the government has, as identified by Collins, occupied the environmental field with 
numerous pieces of environmental legislation, it is likely that a significant range of 
environmental harms – aside from those purely related to conduct of private parties – 
may be linked to the requisite element of government control. 
Stewart notes that it may be possible to initiate a Charter claim due to tortious 
state action.99 For example, if the government violates a common law rule by engaging in 
negligent conduct, this would provide the necessary link to a matter within government 
authority that triggers the Charter. However, he also notes that most courts have kept tort 
issues separate from Charter issues, and thus have not accepted this argument to date. 
Thus, if an individual is subject to environmental harms caused by government 
negligence (or another common law cause of action), they are more likely to have a valid 
claim if the allegation is centered on a breach of tort as opposed to a Charter violation. 
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Step 2: Standing 
Once government conduct of some sort has been called into question, a plaintiff must 
achieve standing to be able to challenge the constitutionality of the conduct. Standing, 
defined broadly, is a requirement of all civil procedures and occurs when a plaintiff has 
an interest in a legal issue and is granted permission to bring that issue before the courts. 
There are two types of standing: individual (this refers to individuals as natural persons) 
and public interest. An individual plaintiff must demonstrate that they are directly 
affected by the conduct and that they have “some chance of proving”100 the claim. For 
example, someone who personally suffers from or is at risk of suffering from the negative 
impacts associated with the alleged source of harm – e.g. a member of the families living 
near the gas wells in Kelly or the proposed wind turbine farms in Dixon – are strong 
candidates for individual standing.  
Individual standing does not mean there can only be one individual involved. This 
was seen in both Kelly and Dixon, where multiple families were parties to the same 
claim. Similarly, individual standing can also be granted with class actions. Under the 
Class Proceedings Act, 1992, class actions are brought by a representative plaintiff on 
behalf of a group of individuals who take a collective action against a defendant.101 
According to section 2(1) of the Act, “one or more members of a class of persons may 
commence a proceeding in the court on behalf of the members of the class.” This was the 
case in Smith v Inco, where Ellen Smith was the representative plaintiff for 7,000 
homeowners in a class action against Inco Limited, owner of a nickel refinery in Port 
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Colborne, Ontario, for nickel particles that had settled on private properties.102 Smith v. 
Inco was a tort claim as opposed to a Charter claims (and it eventually failed), but for 
current purposes it demonstrates that a collective group can bring a claim as individual 
plaintiffs in a single action. In these circumstances, all members of the class action must 
have been affected by a common issue and would be each be granted individual standing 
had they proceeded individually.  
An entity bringing a claim on behalf of another individual or group of individuals 
when the entity itself is not part of the group will not likely be granted individual 
standing. This may arise when public interest groups, such as environmental non-
governmental or non-profit organizations, initiate claims. In these circumstances, public 
interest standing should be sought. Public interest standing can be established even if the 
impugned matter has not yet had a direct impact on an individual.103 In order to achieve 
public interest standing, three things must be considered: i) is there a serious issue raised 
as the to legal invalidity of the government action in question? ii) has it been established 
that the plaintiff is directly affected by the action, or, if not, does the plaintiff have a 
genuine interest in its validity? And iii), is there another reasonable and effective way to 
bring the issue before the Court?104  
In regards to the first consideration, Charter challenges will likely be considered 
to be “serious” issues. However, the second and third considerations may pose challenges 
for public interest plaintiffs, especially environmental organizations, alleging section 7 
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violations. It may be difficult to demonstrate that the entity bringing the claim has a direct 
or genuine interest in the claim, as this may require connecting security of the person 
directly to environmental impacts. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
section of this Chapter, section 7 claims must be rooted in impacts to individuals and not 
solely to the environment. Broad-based environmental impacts may arguably have an 
impact on general human security, but no existing precedent supports an argument that 
harms to an ecosystem or natural features – interests more suited to general public 
interest claims – are suitable for section 7. While not completely analogous (as it was not 
a section 7 case), the complications posed by the relationship between public interest 
plaintiffs and individual interests are demonstrated by MiningWatch’s approach in Red 
Chris. While MiningWatch successfully challenged the decision of the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans, the relief granted was a declaration that the Department erred in 
failing to conduct a comprehensive study and no further relief was granted. This was a 
“strategic” move on behalf on MiningWatch, as they recognized that, as a public interest 
plaintiff, they had no direct interest (in this case, proprietary or pecuniary) in the outcome 
of the case and would not likely be granted a substantive outcome.105 However, there was 
still a benefit to be reaped from the court’s declaration – even though the decision itself 
was not overturned - as it provides guidance for future decisions where the same 
provisions of environmental assessment legislation are engaged. However, if a 
substantive decision is the desired outcome, which is assumed to be the case for section 7 
litigants, then a public interest approach may not be a desirable strategy.  
In regards to the third consideration of other reasonable and effective ways to 
bring the issue before a court, given that the purpose of section 7 is to protect individual 
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interests to life, liberty, and security of the person, it is likely that there will potential 
plaintiffs eligible for individual standing to initiate constitutional challenges to secure 
their own Charter rights. This was the case in Canadian Council of Churches, where the 
Court held that the right of individual claimants to challenge an action demonstrated that 
there were “other reasonable methods of bringing the matter before the Court.”106 In this 
case, there was evidence of individual refugee claimants who had previously challenged 
the impugned legislation. The Court explains that “the basic purpose for allowing public 
interest standing is to ensure that [government actions are] not immunized from 
challenge.” On this ground, the Court ruled that the Council should not be granted public 
interest standing. While public interest standing may be denied merely on the grounds 
that individuals are better suited to a claim, the chance of denial is even greater if 
individual litigants have already commenced similar actions. 
It appears, then, that section 7 challenges to environmental matters are best suited 
to individual plaintiffs. However, the court has repeatedly stated that the threshold for 
establishing standing of either type is intentionally low in order to prevent valid claims 
from being struck out prematurely. Thus, while the concerns outlined above in regards to 
public interest plaintiffs should be taken into consideration, there may be a benefit to 
public interest plaintiffs making the argument that they, despite being a non-natural 
entity, still have a genuine interest in security of the person at large. If it is a novel claim 
addressing a broad environmental concern, such as climate change, a public interest claim 
may be seen as the most reasonable and effective venue for challenging a type of 
government conduct. This may be a difficult argument, but the possibility may be there. 
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Step 3: The two components of section 7 
Once a plaintiff, either as an individual or in the public interest, has addressed the 
preliminary steps of identifying the impugned conduct and demonstrating standing, the 
analysis moves into the section 7 legal framework itself. The legal tests for each element 
of this framework are outlined below. 
A) Step One: Establishing an infringement of the right to security of the person 
First, a plaintiff must establish that there has been a deprivation of life, liberty, and/or 
security of the person. Courts have framed this in several ways, as either a deprivation, an 
infringement, or simply as a negative impact. Regardless of the terminology used, the 
tests are the same. This thesis focuses on security of the person. Collins, Boyd, and Gage 
each argue that if environmental harms can constitute a breach of a section 7 interest, that 
interest will most likely be security of the person, and the case law also demonstrates that 
life and liberty arguments are less ideal. Engaging the liberty interest requires a direct 
interference with the “right to make fundamental personal choices free from state 
interference.”107 Demonstrating a direct interference with liberty is a high threshold, and 
it is primarily engaged in criminal contexts. This is because criminal prohibitions “expose 
[individuals] to the threat of being imprisoned.”108  
Engaging the life interest appears to require a similar, yet higher, threshold than 
security of the person. The SCC recently articulated that the right to life focuses on 
“profound respect for the value of human life” and is engaged when “the law or state 
action imposes death or an increased risk of death on a person, either directly or 
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indirectly.”109 For example, in Insite, the Court found that preventing drug users from 
access life-saving medical aid infringed the right to life.110 Similarly, in Carter, the 
prohibition against assisted suicide led to the premature death of some individuals 
suffering of chronic diseases, as the prohibition had the effect of “forcing some 
individuals to take their own lives prematurely, for fear that they would be incapable of 
doing to when they reached the point where suffering was intolerable.”111 These two 
cases are of the very few instances where an infringement of the right to life was 
successfully made out. 
Security of the person, in contrast, appears to protect against a broader range of 
harm than the right to life. It addresses concerns about “autonomy and quality of life,”112 
and is triggered by impacts to physical or psychological integrity. A risk of death or a 
complete inability to make personal choices is not required. There are two requirements 
for establishing an infringement of the right to security of the person: i) a deprivation of 
or negative impact on the right; and ii) a sufficient causal connection between the 
impugned state conduct and the deprivation of the right. 
i) A negative impact on security of the person 
Courts have held on multiple occasions that security of the person contains both physical 
and psychological components.113 As was recently reiterated by the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice in Dixon, the negative impact on security of the person can occur when 
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there is a “serious and profound effect on a person’s physical or psychological 
integrity.”114 
Physical deprivations of security of the person arise when the government action 
is linked to physical harms to a plaintiff. As noted above, courts have explained that 
physical harms must reach the level of “serious”. What exactly amounts to serious harm 
is slightly ambiguous (with some examples of accepted arguments provided below), but it 
is a high standard that requires more than a level of annoyance. In Dixon, for example, 
the Court held that symptoms such as loss of sleep due to light flicker, nausea, and 
slightly elevated blood pressure did not constitute serious harm.115 Similarly, in 
Millership, “small, opaque, white areas scattered irregularly over the teeth”, a rare side 
effect of fluoridation, had no legal effect on security of the person. 
A serious harm amounting to a physical deprivation of security of the person can 
be established both through an actual deprivation of the right – where the harm has 
already arisen – as well as through the imposition of a risk of harm.116  There are several 
examples of physical deprivations cased by risk of harm in the case law. In Bedford,117 
the Court held that laws that create potentially dangerous conditions are capable of 
violating security of the person. Bedford is a criminal case regarding prostitution laws. 
McLachlin C.J. held that prohibitions against keeping a bawdy house, living off the avails 
of prostitution, and communicating for the purpose of engaging in prostitution in a public 
place “imposed dangerous conditions” on prostitutes engaging in a “risky – but legal – 
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activity”118 by preventing them from taking steps to protect themselves from risk.119 The 
evidence showed that prostitutes unable to control the circumstances surrounding their 
work by taking clients to a designated safe space, hiring body guards, or clearly setting 
limits for clients were at a greater risk of abuse by johns and pimps, and/or more prone to 
disease. The facts in Bedford are not completely analogous with environmental harms, as 
the evidence showed that some women had in fact already been harmed due to these 
laws, but the court’s emphasis on the dangerous conditions that could lead to harm 
demonstrates the preventative function of section 7 as opposed to a purely reactive role. 
By the same token, in Insite, the Court held that the Minister’s decision to prevent drug 
users from accessing the health-protecting services provided by the safe-injection site 
substantially increased the risk of serious harm, which constituted a negative impact on 
the users’ rights to security of the person. In Chaoulli, three judges held that state-
interference with obtaining health care in a reasonable manner infringed security of the 
person.120 Here, the prohibition against private health care insurance increased the risk of 
health complications and death, thus engaging the right.  
The preventative function of section 7 is especially significant for environmental 
applicants concerned with environmental-triggered illness or health issues, as actual harm 
to the plaintiff may not yet have materialized. This was seen in Kelly, as the evidence 
accepted by the Board demonstrated that the exposure to sour gas could cause serious 
health risks.121 The wells had not yet been dug, nor could it be established that the gas 
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would actually affect each individual, yet the Alberta Court of Appeal noted that the 
potential risk could likely violate the rights of all those living within high-risk areas. 
A potentially complicating factor for environmental purposes is that, often, 
evidence of risk of harm arising from a project may not be able to be adduced. In all 
Charter claims, the onus is on the plaintiff to satisfy the court that an actual risk physical 
harm exists, not on the government to demonstrate lack of risk of harm. In the case of 
environmental harms, the scientific evidence required to discharge that burden may not 
exist. Fortunately in Kelly, the health hazards associated with sour gas wells were already 
well documented. In contrast, in Dixon, where the applicants challenged decisions of the 
Director of the Ministry of the Environment to authorize the “construction and operation 
of three wind turbine generation farms”122 in Ontario, the risk of harm was not clear. The 
appellants lived close to these farms, and claimed that the noise caused by the wind 
turbines could cause “adverse health effects”, such as severe headaches, tinnitus, 
insomnia, nausea, and inner ear problems.123 However, as noted above, the plaintiffs were 
unable to adduce any expert evidence at trial showing that the turbines actual increased 
their risk of such harms and the claim was dismissed. 
Moreover, not only were the plaintiffs in Dixon unable to discharge their burden 
of proof, the defendant Minister adduced testimony from several medical experts 
discounting the claims of the plaintiffs. Multiple studies had shown that there is no 
discernable link between wind turbines and impacts to human health above low-level 
annoyance. While this type of counter evidence demonstrating a lack of harm is not 
required of government, this expert evidence of the Minister discredited any evidence the 
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plaintiffs had adduced from personal testimonies and contributed to the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice’s decision to uphold the Director’s authorization. This case is an extreme 
example of fatal evidence, as not only was there no evidence to corroborate their claim, 
but there was also evidence to the contrary. 
When evidence of physical harm or risk of harm is unavailable, it may be 
tempting to frame a claim as a psychological deprivation. For example, some may wish to 
claim that the stresses associated with ecosystem degradation, species loss, or 
contributions to climate change constitute infringements with security of the person. 
However, the case law demonstrates that these types of psychological claims are less 
likely to be successful than claims of physical harm. 
The SCC recognized psychological elements of security of the person in 
Rodriguez. According to the Court, security of the person encompasses “notions of 
personal autonomy (at least with respect to the right to make choices concerning one’s 
own body), control over one’s… psychological integrity which is free from state 
interference, and basic human dignity.”124 In this case, the plaintiff, Sue Rodriguez, 
suffered from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Her condition would eventually leave her 
“extremely” physically disabled and completely dependent on others. Meanwhile, she 
would remain mentally competent and “able to appreciate all that is happening to her”, 
ultimately leaving her in a “situation of utter dependence and loss of dignity.”125 The 
Court held that a criminal prohibition against assisted suicide that prevented her from 
taking her own life before her condition rendered her in such a state infringed the 
psychological component of her security of the person. Her claim ultimately failed as 
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there was no infringement of the principles of fundamental justice. However, the 
significance of Rodriguez for current purposes is the Court’s articulation of the 
requirements of a psychological infringement of security of the person. 
The test for psychological interferences with security of the person is high and 
must be assessed “objectively, with a view to [the] impact on the psychological integrity 
of a person of reasonably sensibility.”126 In G(J), the SCC clarifies that the interference 
must impose severe psychological harm that is “greater than ordinary stress or anxiety” 
and results in a “serious and profound effect on the psychological integrity of a person of 
reasonable sensibility.”127  The issue in G(J) is in regards to the custody of a child. The 
SCC held that “state removal of a child from parental custody” results in a “gross 
intrusion into a private and intimate sphere”128 that infringes the psychological 
component of security of the person. The infringement was due to the stigma that 
allegedly attaches to an ‘unfit’ parent who loses custody. According to the Court, an 
individual’s status as a parent is “fundamental to personal identity”, and interference with 
parental status is serious enough to constitute a psychological deprivation of security of 
the person. However, the Court also clarifies that a strong emotional response, or 
“significant stress and anxiety” associated with the state action is insufficient. Many 
instances of interference with child-parent relationships – such as jail sentences or even 
when the child is negligently shot and killed by a police officer – would not constitute 
infringements of security of the person on their own.129   
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The strict requirements for psychological interferences with security of the person 
imposes potentially significant limitations the environmental section 7 claims. For 
example, the stresses associated with strictly external events, such as impacts to the 
environment, may not be seen to cause more mental distress than the death of a child. 
Similarly, stress caused by risk of harm to family, friends, or future generations, as Boyd 
suggests ought to be protected by environmental rights, will not likely pass the test. What 
is required is a “direct… interfere[ence] with the psychological integrity”130 or autonomy 
– akin to interferences with parental status in G(J) or life-shattering losses of dignity in 
Rodriguez – of a plaintiff.  
The SCC’s recent split-decision in Chaoulli provides some further clarification of 
what might constitute interference with psychological integrity. The matter in this 
Quebec case was a prohibition against obtaining insurance for private health care, 
effectively limiting the health-care options of most Quebeckers, aside from the 
exceptionally wealthy, to what was available through the public system. The evidence 
showed that there tended to be significant wait times for even emergency medical 
procedures, and that the majority of patients with serious illnesses who had to wait for 
treatment suffered worry, anxiety or stress as a result. Three judges (out of seven – the 
3/3/1 split means that there is no majority decision coming from this case, affecting its 
strength as precedence) held that this “adverse psychological impact can have a serious 
and profound effect on a person’s psychological integrity, and is a violation of security of 
the person.”131 The psychological impact was caused not by any sort of physical harm 
itself (the harm was directly caused by the various illnesses and ailments of the 
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plaintiffs), but from a state interference with the plaintiff’s ability to remedy the harm by 
seeking effective health care. The resulting “loss of control by an individual over [their] 
own health”132 was considered to be above normal stress and anxiety, and into the realm 
of interference with physical integrity or autonomy. 
Chaoulli demonstrates that it may be possible to argue that interferences with the 
ability to exercise control over livelihood may constitute a psychological deprivation of 
security of the person. For example, while the public welfare issue in Gosselin 
demonstrates that the government is not required to uphold a certain level of financial 
stability, a direct interference with the ability of individuals to obtain financial security 
themselves might suffice.133 Take, for example, fishers. If a project results in discharge of 
a contaminates into a body of water and destroys a fishery, individuals dependent on that 
fishery to earn a livelihood may be able to claim that the interference interferes with their 
personal autonomy in a manner that violates their security of the person. This type of 
claim may be especially applicable for individuals in isolated communities that are 
entirely dependent on a particular resource. In addition, the Court’s comments in Kelly 
demonstrate that while individuals may theoretically have the option to relocate and 
avoid the harm, this may not be a meaningful choice due to finances or family 
obligations.  
However, a claim related to loss of control over livelihood may be a difficult 
argument. There is no specific precedent supporting the proposition that an interference 
with livelihood constitutes an interference with security of the person, and the most on-
point case, Chaoulli, does not constitute a majority decision. Also, for reasons discussed 
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below, courts have been hesitant to interpret section 7 in a way that requires them to 
make rulings related to economic or property interests.  
Given the stricter and higher test for demonstrating a psychological interference, 
plaintiffs will likely have greater chances of success by alleging physical deprivations of 
security of the person. Moreover, if the alleged stress is caused by physical risks of harm 
associated with living in a toxic environment, then the plaintiff will have already 
demonstrated a physical interference with security of the person and will not need to 
make a psychological argument.  
ii) Sufficient causation 
There is a second part to demonstrating an infringement of security of the person. In 
addition to proving a negative impact on the right, a plaintiff must establish a causal 
connection between the impact and the impugned government action. Specifically, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that there is a “sufficient causal 
connection” between the government conduct and the negative impact.134 This test “does 
not require that the impugned government action or law be the only or the dominant 
cause of the prejudice suffered by the claimant, and is satisfied by a reasonable inference, 
drawn on a balance of probabilities.”135 The SCC has held that the standard for a causal 
connection is flexible, allowing for the circumstances of each case to be taken into 
consideration, and not “too high” to prevent dismissing meritorious claims.136  Thus, 
while the interference must be real and not purely speculative, the test does not demand 
absolute proof of causation.  
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For physical interferences with security of the person, the government conduct 
need not be the direct cause of the negative impact. Indirect interferences were seen in 
both Insite and Bedford. In Insite, the direct source of harm to Insite’s clients – 
individuals using street drugs – was unsafe injection conditions. However, the court held 
that the Minister of Health’s interference with access to Insite’s life-saving services 
sufficiently caused the drug users to be subject to the direct source of harm. In Bedford, 
the direct source of harm to prostitutes was abusive johns and pimps. Again, the Court 
held that there was sufficient causal connection between the laws interfering with access 
to protection measures (in this case, by prohibiting prostitutes from implementing safety 
measures into their practices) and the abuse. In the environmental context, it is likely that 
the government conduct need not be the direct source of the environmental harm. The 
direct source may stem from projects of third parties, demonstrating that if the 
government has played an enabling role – such as authorizing the drilling operations 
causing the release of sour gas close to the Kellys’ property – there may be sufficient 
causation. 
Boyd, Collins, and Gage all anticipate that a primary challenge that environmental 
section 7 claimants will face is proving that the deprivation or risk of deprivation of life, 
liberty, or security of the person is actually caused by the impugned government conduct, 
due to the inherent uncertainty related to the relationship between environmental impacts 
and harms to individuals. In Bedford and Insite, there was concrete evidence of the 
connection between the source of harm and the harm suffered. It is more difficult to draw 
a conclusive connection between environmental harms – such as industrial fumes, sour 
gas, excessive noise, and certain contaminants – and specific health concerns because 
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there will often be a lack of scientific certainty to corroborate those claims. Indeed, all 
previous section 7 plaintiffs who have based their claim in environmental-based harms 
have had fatal difficulties with this step. No applicant has successfully demonstrated a 
negative impact on security of the person that was sufficiently caused by government 
conduct, demonstrating the inherent difficulties of connecting environmental harms to 
actual health risks. In Operation Dismantle, the applicants claimed that cruise missile 
testing violated their section 7 rights by rendering Canada a more likely target for nuclear 
attack. The SCC dismissed the applicant on the grounds that the applicants did not 
demonstrate that the government’s approval for testing caused an actual increase in the 
risk of nuclear war. In another example, in Energy Probe (1994), a group of plaintiffs 
challenged a provision of the Nuclear Liability Act that provided an absolute liability of 
$75 million for operators of nuclear facilities for all claims relating to a nuclear accident. 
The Ontario Court (General Division) held that the limitations on recovery did not cause 
an increased risk of a nuclear accident, and thus did not cause a negative impact to 
security of the person.137  
In both Locke and Millership, the plaintiffs alleged that the addition of fluoride to 
public drinking water infringed their security of the person.138 However, the reasons that 
their claims failed are fairly clear. Mr. Locke failed to provide any evidence of adverse 
health effects or emotional distress. Mr. Millership claimed that his security of the person 
was infringed by injuries he believed he suffered through a mild case of fluorosis that 
“may cause him psychological stress”.139 The British Columbia Supreme Court held that 
the fluoridation of public water did intrude on Millership’s general security of the person; 
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however, it was a trivial, or “minimal intrusion” that did not engage his right to security 
of the person.140 
As explained by Collins, there may not be evidence to demonstrate “how 
synthetic chemicals and other environmental contaminants interact with and affect natural 
systems, including the human body [due to] the complexity of natural systems, the 
(ethical) impossibility of testing industrial chemicals on humans, the extreme novelty of 
synthetic chemicals in evolutionary history, the sheer number of synthetic chemicals in 
existence, and the paucity of data on the health and environmental effects of such 
chemicals.”141 It may often be difficult, or even impossible, to “delineate with any 
precision the real-world consequences of releasing chemical pollutants into the 
environment.”142 Thus, as noted by Gage, “the evidence would inevitably depend on 
statistical materials relating to risk and probable harm, rather than the conclusive proof of 
causation and harm that the courts have generally preferred.”143 Indeed, the cases above 
show that demonstrating an environmental deprivation of the right to security of the 
person will likely require a compelling set of facts before the Charter can interfere. The 
evidence need not be 100% conclusive, but in order to discharge their burden of proof, 
plaintiffs must demonstrate that, on a balance of probabilities, the risk of harm is actually 
caused, at least in part, by the alleged source. In neither Locke, Millership, nor Dixon 
were the plaintiffs able to bring forth evidence of risk of harm or a connection between 
that harm and fluoride or wind turbines beyond their own testimonies. In contrast, had the 
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plaintiffs in these cases adduced medical or scientific expert evidence or peer-reviewed 
studies, the results may have been otherwise. 
Kelly, however, demonstrates that it is possible to demonstrate a causal 
connection between risks of adverse physical impacts, such as specific health damages, 
on an identifiable person or group of people and identifiable sources of environmental 
harm, such as sour gas. However, moving beyond these smaller claims and into the realm 
of broader environmental concerns, such as climate change, is likely a difficult leap for 
section 7 at this point. While an analysis of the causes and effects of climate change is 
well beyond the scope of this paper, it is assumed that identifying the specific causes and 
facilitators of climate change (and identifying which government actions or 
authorizations were at play) and linking those sources of harm to the actual impacts 
suffered by individuals alleging a claim requires a higher level of certainty than is 
currently available in order to support a section 7 claim. 
Demonstrating a psychological interference with security of the person appears to 
require an even closer connection between the source of the harm and its negative effect. 
The case law suggests that the state action may need to be the direct cause of the 
limitation, as opposed to the indirect connection allowed for physical harms. In both 
Rodriguez and Chaoulli, the impugned laws directly prohibited the plaintiffs from 
making a particular choice – committing assisted suicide or accessing health care – thus 
interfering with the plaintiffs’ autonomy over their own persons. Interferences with 
personal autonomy are psychological in nature, meaning that it was the impugned laws in 
these  cases that directly caused the resulting psychological deprivation of security of the 
person. In contrast, the SCC in Blencoe held that the respondent’s stress and anxiety 
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“resulted from… publicity surrounding [sexual assault allegations] coupled with the 
political fall-out which ensued rather than… the human rights proceedings 
[themselves]”.144 In this case, the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate direct causation 
(when, arguably, there was an indirect connection between the proceedings and the 
stress) and the claim was dismissed.  
This stricter test for psychological causation coupled with the stricter test for a 
psychological negative impact is another reason why environmental litigants would be 
wise to frame their claims in terms of physical rather than psychological harms. While 
environmental impacts might bring about unfavourable conditions, it is unlikely that the 
government will have sufficiently interfered with an individual’s ability to take their own 
initiatives to avoid the harm. 
B) Step Two: Demonstrating a Violation of The Principles of Fundamental Justice 
Once a claimant has demonstrated an infringement of their security of the person, they 
must then demonstrate that the infringement did not comply with the principles of 
fundamental justice. The principles of fundamental justice are the “values that are 
sufficiently fundamental to restrain the exercise of state power when the subject’s most 
vital interests – life, liberty, and security of the person – are at stake.”145 In Reference re: 
Motor Vehicle Act, Lamer C.J. explains that the principles of fundamental justice are 
found “in the basic tenets of the legal system. They do not lie in the realm of general 
public policy but in the inherent domain of the judiciary as guardian of the justice 
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system,”146 and provide “the minimum requirements”147 that an action that negatively 
impacts the rights to life, liberty, or security of the person must meet. The provision itself 
does not “catalogue the principles of fundamental justice to which it refers, [but the SCC] 
has worked to define the minimum constitutional requirements that a law that trenches of 
life, liberty, or security of the person must met.”148  
Stewart explains that it can be helpful to conceptualize the principles of 
fundamental justice that have been identified by courts to date as either substantive or 
procedural in nature.149 Substantive principles are those that can be clearly defined and 
identified, and can be loosely grouped into two categories. (Note: This categorization is 
done for simplicity’s sake when providing an overview of the principles of fundamental 
justice. Stewart notes that these categories are not likely exhaustive or mutually 
exclusive.) The first substantive category consists of principles of fundamental justice 
that can be applied generally to any government action, which are sometimes framed as 
rules. Such principles include the rules against arbitrary, overbroad, grossly 
disproportionate, and vague laws.150 These rules involve a comparison of the object of the 
law with its effect, and work to address failures of instrumental rationality or precision. 
The second category of substantive principles identified by Stewart demand specific 
outcomes from or qualities of state actions. For example, it has been argued that the 
ruling in Suresh provides a principle of fundamental justice that explicitly protects 
individuals against deportation when faced with a substantial risk of torture.151 This 
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substantive principle does not address a specific piece of irrational legislation, but 
requires governments to protect potential deportees from the consequences at all times.   
Principles of fundamental justice related to procedural rights inform the content of 
procedural requirements for decisions affecting section 7 interests.152 When analyzing 
whether or not there has been a violation of the principles based on a failure to uphold 
procedural fairness, courts will ask “whether the procedural protection provided in 
particular circumstances was adequate.”153 Thus, procedural fairness does not work to 
provide a substantive outcome, as the substantive rules discussed above do, but to ensure 
that the process through which an outcome is reached was made in a procedurally sound 
manner.  
In Carter, the SCC provides a “general comment” to be considered before 
determining whether a deprivation of security of the person is in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice. Mainly, the Court cautions that judges are not to be  
concerned with competing social interests or public benefits conferred by the 
impugned law. These competing moral claims and broad societal benefits are 
more appropriately considered at the stage of justification under s. 1 of the 
Charter… In some cases, the government, for practical reasons, may only be able 
to meet an objective by means of a law that has some fundamental flaw. But this 
does not concern us when considering whether section 7… has been breached.154 
 
The following section provides an analysis of the principles of fundamental justice that 
may apply in an environmental context.  
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i) Substantive principles of fundamental justice 
Arbitrariness 
The rule against arbitrariness stipulates that there must always be a rational connection 
between the purpose or object of a government action and its effect (i.e., the negative 
impact identified in step one). In Insite, McLachlin C.J. clarifies that there must be a “real 
connection on the facts” between the public good that is the law’s objective and the action 
taken to further that objective.  
The SCC has identified two approaches to arbitrariness: the “unnecessary” 
approach and the “inconsistent” approach, with the first being the less onerous on the 
plaintiff. Which of these two approaches ought to prevail, however, is unclear, as the 
successful arbitrariness claims arising since the identification of both of these approaches 
have met the test for both.155 Under the unnecessary approach, an applicant may only 
need to demonstrate that the effect of an action was unnecessary to achieve a desired 
purpose. In Chaoulli, McLachlin C. J. found that a restriction on obtaining insurance for 
private health care was not necessary to further the alleged purpose of the restriction, 
which was to strengthen the public health care system. The government of Quebec 
reasoned that if too many individuals opted for private health care, the public health care 
system would eventually suffer. However, due to the fact that the public health system 
was overloaded, and the restriction prevented individuals from accessing timely health 
care (which McLachlin C. J. found to infringe their security of the person while doing 
nothing actually to enhance the public system) the restriction was unnecessary for 
achieving the desired purpose and was arbitrary.  
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The inconsistent approach to arbitrariness is stricter. Under the test for 
inconsistency, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the effect of a law is inconsistent with 
its purpose. An example of an inconsistent action was seen in Insite. In this case, a 
decision of the Minister of Health to refuse to grant an exemption from drug possession 
prohibitions to Insite increased the risk of death and disease to Insite’s clients. This effect 
was contrary, or inconsistent, to the purpose of the Controlled Drugs and Substances 
Act156 – under which the Minister derived his power to grant exemptions – to protect 
public health and safety. Because the effect of the decision undermined the very purpose 
of the Act, the Court held that the decision violated the rule against arbitrariness and the 
Minister was required to grant the exemption. Similarly, in Morgentaler, a provision 
under the Criminal Code157 requiring all abortions to be approved by a therapeutic 
abortion committee of an accredited or approved hospital caused significant delays, 
which were often detrimental to the health of women seeking abortions. This negative 
impact on health was inconsistent with the purpose of the requirement, which was to 
allegedly protect women’s health, rendering the requirement arbitrary. In contrast, the 
restriction on obtaining private health care in Chaoulli was not inconsistent with the 
legislative scheme, but was simply unnecessary in order to achieve the desired outcome 
of improved public health care. 
It remains largely unclear which approach to arbitrariness ought to apply in a 
given circumstance,158 and thus it is difficult to anticipate what standard an alleged 
arbitrary environmental action must meet. Ideally, the unnecessary approach will prevail, 
as demonstrating that there is no connection between actions relating to environmental 
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decisions and their resulting outcomes will likely be challenging. As noted above, section 
7 claims related to environmental harms must be rooted in a negative impact to the 
physical or psychological wellbeing of the individual, and environmental legislation may 
not be focused on harms to individuals. The argument in Insite was successful because 
the Minister’s decision caused the opposite effect of what the legislation explicitly 
intended – to promote public health and safety. In Bedford, the prohibitions were 
designed to protect prostitutes from harm and exploitation, but in fact achieved the 
opposite by increasing the chances that the women would be exposed to the harm. In both 
of these cases, the governing legislation was designed to protect individuals. The effects 
complained of in environmental claims, in contrast, are less likely to be rooted in 
legislation designed to protect individuals, rendering the “no connection” argument 
inapplicable. 
Overbreadth 
Another way of framing the unnecessary approach to arbitrariness is through the rule 
against overly broad actions, also known as overbreadth. This principle addresses laws 
that are arbitrary in part, and, while it exists as a stand-alone principle, it is strikingly 
similar to the “unnecessary” approach to arbitrariness. According to the SCC, an action is 
overbroad when it goes “too far”,159 or there is “no rational connection between the 
purposes… and some but not all, of its impacts”.160 The most recent application of the 
overbreadth principle is Carter. In this case, the court explains its application of 
overbreadth and concluded that a 
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prohibition on assisted dying is overbroad. The object of the law… is to protect 
vulnerable persons from being induced to commit suicide at a moment of 
weakness [and] the law catches people outside of this class. [The Crown conceded 
that it] is recognized that not every person who wishes to commit suicide is 
vulnerable, and that there may be people with disabilities who have a considered, 
rational and persistent wish to end their own lives… It follows that the limitation 
on their rights is at least in some cases not connected to the objective of protecting 
vulnerable persons.”161 
 
The Court held that the blanket prohibition against assisted suicide caught conduct that 
was unrelated to the law’s objective and was overbroad. 
 An earlier example of overbreadth is seen in Heywood.162 Here, the Court held 
that a law prohibiting all individuals convicted of sex offences from entering all parks 
was overbroad. The purpose of the prohibition was to prevent individuals convicted of 
child-related offences from accessing children’s playgrounds. However, the effect of this 
law was that it also prevented other non-dangerous offenders, such as an 18-year old 
convicted of statutory rape with an otherwise consenting partner, from ever being able to 
go for a hike in any park. One potential impact of the law – incarcerating 18-year old 
hikers – was not rationally connected to the purpose of protecting children from 
pedophiles. Because of this single potential effect, the law was deemed to be 
unconstitutional and was struck down.  
An enticing asset to the overbreadth doctrine is that it allows for the reasonable 
use of hypotheticals. This is in contrast to arbitrariness, which requires an irrational 
connection on the facts in order to strike down a law or overturn an action. In Heywood, 
the accused actually had previously been convicted of sexual crimes against children, and 
was then being charged for taking photographs of children in playgrounds. But, because 
he was able to provide a ‘reasonable’ hypothetical situation where the law was overbroad, 
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the provision was struck down. It may seem that using hypotheticals would assist in an 
environmental context, in particular if actual harm or risk of harm has not yet arisen or 
cannot be proven. However, the benefit of hypotheticals will not likely be able to be 
capitalized on due to the general circumstances of environmental claims. Overbreadth has 
mainly been applied in a criminal context, where the liberty interest is automatically 
engaged. In criminal law, an accused will not face the challenge of demonstrating an 
initial violation of section 7 interests because the risk of incarceration associated with 
criminal law by default violates the right to liberty and meets that standard. In contrast, 
one of the main challenges faced by environmental applicants alleging a breach of 
security of the person is demonstrating causation through evidence of harm. 
Environmental applicants will have already been required to demonstrate an actual 
situation causing harm in step one, meaning they will not be able to benefit from the 
potential use of a hypothetical situation that comes with overbreadth. Thus, in general, it 
appears that the benefits of an overbreadth argument (over arbitrariness) are only 
available to violations of section 7 where the right to liberty is engaged in a criminal 
context, not security of the person.  
Therefore, there appears to be no practical difference between basing an 
environmental argument in arbitrariness or overbreadth. The primary importance of 
emphasizing the Court’s recent reference to the existence of the overbreadth doctrine is 
that it implies that the less-strict version of arbitrariness – the unnecessary approach – 
may still be applicable to situations where the strength of the connection between the 
cause and effect is less clear. 
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Other substantive principles of fundamental justice 
There are several other substantive principles of fundamental justice that have been 
identified in the literature as being potentially useful in an environmental context: the 
rules against grossly disproportionate laws and vagueness. However, there are limitations 
inherent in each rule that renders them less effective than the rules against arbitrariness or 
overbreadth when the environment is involved.  
Gross Disproportionality 
The rule against grossly disproportionate laws protects against “state actions or 
legislative responses to a problem that are so extreme as to be disproportionate to any 
legitimate government interest.”163 The connection between the purpose and effect of a 
grossly disproportionate law may be rational, but the negative impact imposed on the 
applicant far outweighs any derived benefit.  
Environmental applicants would be wise to avoid gross disproportionality. By 
claiming gross disproportionality, the applicant must demonstrate that the harm to 
themselves when compared to any benefits to society not just tips the scale (i.e., on a 
balance of probabilities), but creates a landslide in their favour that is more comparable to 
the criminal standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt. As McLachlin C.J. explains 
in Bedford, “the rule against gross disproportionality only applies in extreme cases where 
the seriousness of the deprivation is totally out of sync with the objective of the 
measure… The connection between the … impact of the [government action] and its 
objective must be entirely outside the norms accepted in our free and democratic 
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society.”164 Further, while generally the Court has stated that the interests of society are 
not to be balanced with the interests of the individual in a section 7 analysis, gross 
disproportionality explicitly invites those considerations to the analysis. Given the 
political emphasis on economic growth, which will likely be associated with actions 
leading to adverse environmental effects, demonstrating gross disproportionality will 
likely be a difficult standard to meet. 
Vagueness 
A law that infringes security of the person cannot be overly vague. In Nova Scotia 
Pharmaceutical Society, Gonthier J. explains that this means that all laws “irrespective of 
whether they are civil, criminal, administrative or other” must be precise enough “to give 
sufficient guidance for legal debate.”165 There are two ways that a law can be vague: 1) 
by failing to give those who might come within the ambit of the provision fair notice of 
the consequences of their conduct; or (2) by failing to adequately limit law enforcement 
discretion.166 The rule against vagueness does not demand that a law provide absolute 
certainty, only reasonable certainty. As explained by Stewart, there will almost always be 
uncertainty within laws, and demanding absolute certainty would prevent the legal 
system from being able to operate efficiently.167  Thus, laws may leave room for debate, 
such how they will apply to a particular set of facts. As noted by Stewart, “the fact that 
there can be an intelligible debate about the boundaries of the law’s application itself 
indicates that the law is sufficiently precise.”168  
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There has been only one successful section 7 case where vagueness was argued. 
In O’Neill v Canada, a police officer searched a reporter’s home on allegations that the 
reported had committed offences under the Security of Information Act.169 The reporter 
argued that the sections of the Act that he allegedly violated contained terms – “secret 
official” and “official” – that were unconstitutionally vague. The Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice found that these terms were not defined in the statute, and “could not be 
interpreted so as to define a zone of risk that could guide the conduct of individuals and 
structure law enforcement discretion.”170 This rendered the offence in question 
“unconstitutionally vague for not sufficiently delineating the risk zone for criminal 
sanction.”171  
For environmental purposes, the vagueness doctrine may be most applicable for 
challenging administrative laws and procedures that do not adequately limit the 
discretionary power of administrative decision-makers when section 7 rights are engaged. 
However, it is currently unclear what would constitute an unduly vague provision of 
administrative discretion. An unlimited range of options for a final decision, or a failure 
to identify any factors to be taken into consideration when making a decision may render 
a law overly vague; however, it appears that any sort of guidance to decision makers may 
suffice.172 In Canadian Pacific, the SCC upheld the constitutionally of a provision that 
was arguably vague.173 The Court stated that due to the complex nature of environmental 
protection, broadly worded provisions are often necessary. Stewart explains that “[e]ven 
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where statutes incorporate relatively imprecise concepts such as ‘reasonableness’ or 
‘undueness,’ Canadian courts provide those concepts with more determinate content 
through the process of statutory interpretation and applicant to specific fact situations; 
therefore, courts have been generally unwilling to find them unconstitutionally vague.”174 
A new principle of fundamental justice? 
A plaintiff may allege that an infringement of their security of the person violates a 
principle of fundamental justice that has been previously unrecognized by the court. The 
SCC has acknowledged that the principles of fundamental justice “cannot be given any 
exhaustive content or simple enumerative definition, but will take on concrete meaning as 
the courts address alleged violations of section 7.”175 The evolution of the principles is 
seen most clearly in the realm of criminal law, where a multitude of principles that apply 
when a person is criminally liable for their conduct have been recognized over time.176  
For example, protection against self-incrimination is a principle of fundamental justice, 
meaning that an individual is to be protected from the “use and derivative use of 
compelled statements in subsequent proceedings.”177 Other principles that have been 
created to address specific violations of section 7 include protection against deportation 
when the refugee faces a substantial risk of torture, and protection against extradition to 
face criminal charges for which they may receive the death penalty.178  
In Carter, the appellants asked the Court to consider a new principle of parity, 
which would “require that offenders committing acts of comparable blameworthiness 
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receive sanctions of like severity.”179 Given that the Court had already found that the 
offence against assisted suicide violated the principle of overbreadth, the Court did not 
consider this argument. However, it demonstrates that alleging a new principle is an 
available, though not yet demonstrably successful, strategy for section 7 litigants.  
An explicit environmental principle of fundamental justice does not currently 
exist. However, it may be possible to argue that a government action violates a ‘new’ 
substantive principle of fundamental justice, a question that has been largely unexplored 
in the literature. In Malmo-Levine, the SCC provides a three-part test for identifying 
principles of fundamental justice. First, it must be a legal principle. Second, there must be 
significant societal consensus that the new principle is fundamental to the way in which 
the legal system ought fairly to operate. Third, the principle must be capable of being 
identified with sufficient precision to yield a manageable standard against which to 
measure deprivations of life, liberty or security of the person.180  In Malmo-Levine, the 
accused proposed that the “harm principle” – which provides that the “absence of 
demonstrated harm to others deprives Parliament of the power to impose criminal 
liability” – was a principle of fundamental justice.181 The principle failed the third part of 
the test as “harm” could not be identified with sufficient precision.  
This section outlines the requirements for applying the Malmo-Levine test to a 
context involving the environment. The first step is to identify an appropriate legal 
principle or rule that could constitute a principle of fundamental justice.182 Collins briefly 
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identifies several potential principles: respect for human life, the requirement that 
government act in compliance with the law (including other sections of the Charter),183 
and prevention of trade-offs that are “grossly disproportionate” to the government’s 
legitimate interest.184 These three proposed principles are not discussed in this section, 
but are included to illustrate what form general environmental principles may take. 
The precautionary principle, on the other hand, is one that has been given a 
significant amount of attention, and while it has not yet been applied to the Malmo-
Levine test, was proposed to be a principle of fundamental justice by Gage, Collins, and 
the plaintiffs in Dixon.185 There are several approaches to applying “precaution” to 
decision-making processes. For example, while Government of Canada recognizes that 
precaution includes three “basic tenets: the need for a decision, a risk of serious or 
irreversible harm and a lack of full scientific certainty”,186 a report on the application of 
precaution in science-based decision making about risks acknowledges that Canada’s 
application of precaution is “flexible and responsive to particular circumstances.”187 For 
the purposes of providing an example application of the Malmo-Levine test, the version 
of the precautionary principles as provided in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration is used. 
Given that the first part of the Malmo-Levine test requires the identification of an explicit 
legal principle, it is helpful to consider a version of the precautionary principle that has 
been clearly defined and widely referenced. The Rio Declaration provides that “[w]here 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
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not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.”188  
A second environmental principle that is analyzed in this section is an 
environmental harm principle. Gage suggests that environmental harm may give rise to a 
substantive principle of fundamental justice if the government conduct “represent[s] such 
a serious and imminent threat… that its authorization under any circumstances violates 
the principles of fundamental justice.” This “environmental harm” principle is one that 
may have been applicable to three of the case studies discussed so far – Kelly, Dixon, and 
Chemical Valley. The precautionary principle and Gage’s environmental harm principle 
are applied to the remainder of the Malmo-Levine test. 
Next, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there is significant societal consensus that 
the principle is fundamental to the way in which the legal system ought to operate.189  For 
example in Rodriguez, the Court held that committing suicide did not reflect the 
fundamental values of society, and thus would not have general acceptance among 
reasonable people.190 (However, this issue was later revisited in Carter, where the same 
provision was found to violate the principles of fundamental justice on the grounds that it 
was overly broad.) This step is likely the least challenging for a plaintiff alleging the 
environmental harm principle, particularly when human health is on the line. As outlined 
above, the Court has repeatedly recognized that environmental protection is a 
“fundamental value” to Canadian citizens.191 The precautionary principle, however, may 
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face difficulties here. On the one hand, the principle has been cited in case law and 
various pieces of legislation as an important component of environmental decision-
making. For example, in Spraytech, the SCC discusses the precautionary principles and 
notes that “[s]cholars have documented the precautionary principle’s inclusion in 
‘virtually every adopted treaty and policy document related to the protection and 
preservation of the environment.’… As a result, there may be ‘currently sufficient state 
practice to allow a good argument that the precautionary principle is a principle of 
customary international law.”192 Further, several pieces of environmental legislation in 
Canada make reference to the precautionary principle, including the Oceans Act and 
CEAA 2012.193 However, even this repeated legal reference to the precautionary principle 
may not be sufficient to establish that it has been accepted widely enough to constitute a 
principle of fundamental justice. While in R v Hape the SCC held that customary 
international law is directly incorporated into Canadian law, it may be difficult to 
conclude that international treatment of the precautionary principle will be directly 
binding on Canadian courts, given its uncertain status as customary law.194 Further, the 
precautionary principle has been subject to significant debate, rendering it arguably less 
‘fundamental’ than the Malmo-Levine test requires.195 Furthermore, the version of the 
precautionary principle in the Rio Declaration contains the potentially fatal economic 
component, as courts must be convinced of their role to require the government to 
implement cost-effective measures. 
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Third, the principle must be capable of being identified with sufficient precision 
to yield a manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty or 
security of the person.196 Thus, it is critical that the principle itself not be overly broad or 
vague. For example, the original harm principle in Malmo-Levine was rejected, as it was 
not a manageable standard. According to the Court, harm “can take a multitude of forms, 
including economic, physical and social”.197 What constitutes “environmental harm” may 
be reminiscent of the harm principle in Malmo-Levine, and be considered to be too vague 
to yield a manageable standard. A “serious and imminent threat” is potentially too 
ambiguous; the parameters of a proposed environmental harm principle must be clearly 
contained. Elements of the precautionary principle, on the other hand, arguably provide 
more specific guidance. The evidence will demonstrate whether or not there is a lack of 
full scientific certainty, and, ideally, it should be clear from government’s actions 
whether or not this lack of certainty was relied upon when rendering a decision. These are 
questions that a court could come to a reasonable conclusion on based on the facts before 
them. Still, the economic component poses problems here, as courts may be hesitant to 
dictate whether or not a preventative measure is “cost-effective.” 
When proposing a new principle of fundamental justice, applicants must be very 
careful to frame the principle as one that is clearly fundamental to Canadian society and 
its legal system. Otherwise, it risks becoming a policy argument or a “reflect[ion] of the 
Court’s opinion on a particular social issue,”198 violating the separation of powers. 
McLachlin C.J.’s introductory comment in Chaoulli that in “failing to provide public 
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health care of a reasonable standard within a reasonable time,”199 the government 
triggered section 7 has been interpreted as implying that access to reasonable health care 
within a reasonable time constitutes a principle of fundamental justice.200 The issue of 
private health care had been subject to serious political debate over several years – much 
like the need for environmental protection – and Binnie and LeBel J.J., in their dissenting 
judgment, criticize McLachlin’s finding that the provision of “reasonable health services 
at a reasonable time” is a principle of fundamental justice. Not only was this principle too 
political in nature, but also, according to the dissent, it was also too vague to be applied 
aptly by courts. It is not the duty of the courts, they argue, to determine what constitutes 
“reasonable” health services. That, according to Binnie and Lebel, should be left to the 
legislatures and democratically-elected officials. Similarly, asking the courts to determine 
what is cost-effective or what constitutes an unacceptable level of environmental harm 
would likely receive the same negative treatment. 
Moreover, it is also arguable that McLachlin’s judgment does not propose the 
introduction of a new principle of fundamental justice explicitly providing reasonable 
health care. In her ruling, she held that the impugned legislative scheme, on the facts, 
violated the rule against arbitrariness, not a free-standing principle regarding health care. 
McLachlin based her finding of unconstitutionality not a failure to provide reasonable 
health care, but because she found that the evidence showed, on the facts, an arbitrary 
link between the stated purpose of the prohibition and its effects. Furthermore, at no point 
did the Chief Justice apply the Malmo-Levine test for recognizing a new principle. For 
environmental purposes, what is significant is that McLachlin’s decision does not appear 
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to stand for a new, substantive right to reasonable health care, and thus does support the 
development of other rights related to public policy. Applying this interpretation of the 
Chaoulli decision, section 7 has not yet been interpreted in a manner that grants a 
substantive right to an otherwise political matter. 
Thus, while courts are willing to recognize new principles of fundamental justice 
under the Malmo-Levine test, they must act within their jurisdiction, which is another 
strike against implementing the precautionary principle as a principle of fundamental 
justice. The precautionary principle risks crossing the line by calling for an explicit type 
of action – to not postpone cost-effective measures – in the face of risk of harm. What 
constitutes a ‘cost-effective’ approach will likely depend upon a variety of political as 
well as economic factors, ranging from the allocation of funds in a federal budget to 
dictating contractual terms. Determining what is cost-effective more resembles a policy 
goal, not a way in which the Canadian society ought to operate in order to uphold the 
most basic rights to life, liberty, and security of the person. A better role for the 
precautionary principle, then, may be to argue that it ought to inform the content of 
procedural fairness.  
ii) Procedural fairness as a principle of fundamental justice 
Procedural fairness is a principle of fundamental justice that, as its name suggests, 
requires all administrative decisions that may have a negative impact on an individual’s 
right to life, liberty, or security of the person to be procedurally fair. Grant Huscroft 
explains that procedural fairness, which can also framed as a duty of fairness, 
promotes sound public administration and the accountability of public decision-
makers by ensuring that decisions are made with input from those affected by 
them; well-informed decisions are likely better decisions, and decisions made 
pursuant to transparent, participatory processes promote important rule-of-law 
 73 
values. Fairness is, in this sense, a means to an end … [and] ensures that people 
are allowed to participate meaningfully in decision-making processes that affect 
them.”201 
 
Procedural fairness is the “organizing principle” of administrative law, and “applies 
across the spectrum of decisions that public authorities may make.”202 While most of the 
case law developing the content of procedural fairness occurred outside of a 
constitutional context, Stewart explains that the “the considerations relevant to 
determining the content of the duty of fairness are the same [when there is] a 
constitutionally-protected interest at stake.” 203  
In the early days of the Charter, Colin P. Stevenson recognized that section 7 
could promote the development of an “environmental ethic” in Canada, particularly for 
upholding procedural safeguards when it comes to government-sponsored environmental 
impacts.204 While he idealized a “radical approach” to interpreting section 7 in a manner 
that results in substantive environmental rights, he conceded that the enforcement of 
procedural safeguards is likely the most realistic expectation. However, Stevenson 
cautioned against underestimating the value of these procedures, noting that, at the end of 
the day, procedural rights may be “just as effective as any substantive [environmental] 
right”205 for providing protection against adverse environmental impacts. While it is 
difficult to quantify and compare the effectiveness of substantive environmental rights 
under section 7 with procedural safeguards, the case law upholds Stevenson’s projection 
that procedural fairness could play a valuable role.  
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Determining the content of procedural fairness 
While the purpose of the duty of fairness is to ensure a fair process, it is often difficult to 
anticipate what a fair process will actually look like. L’Heureux-Dube J. explains that 
“’the concept of procedural fairness is eminently variable and its content is to be decided 
in the specific context of each case. All of the circumstances must be considered in order 
to determine the content of the duty of procedural fairness.”206 However, the case law 
provides some general guidance. The brief answer is that there is a minimum level of 
procedures required when section 7 is engaged: notice, participation, and reasons. 
However, there are several factors that can be considered to determine whether or not 
more procedures ought to be provided. Finally, even if the overall framework of the 
procedures was “correct”, there can still be a breach of the duty of fairness if the 
decision-maker demonstrates a reasonable apprehension of bias. 
When analyzing whether procedural fairness has been upheld, there are two broad 
questions that can be asked. First, whether the correct considerations were taken into 
account by the administrative decision-maker when determining the content of procedural 
fairness, and, second, whether the actual content of the process itself – i.e., the particular 
procedures provided- were sufficient. Baker is the leading case regarding the first 
question, and discusses several factors that may be taken into consideration by decision-
makers when determining what procedures to implement in particular circumstances.207  
Baker is an immigration case. Mavis Baker, the plaintiff, was an illegal immigrant 
originally from Jamaica who had lived and worked in Canada for 11 years as a live-in 
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domestic worker. During these 11 years she had four children, all of whom were 
Canadian citizens. In 1992, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ordered her to be 
deported. Under the Immigration Regulations,208 all applicants seeking permanent 
residence were required to apply from outside Canada. In Mrs. Baker’s case, she was 
required to leave Canada and apply from Jamaica. This would result in her leaving her 
children for an extended period of time and have a serious impact on her financial 
stability. She applied for an exemption provided for in the Regulations, arguing that the 
Minister ought to exempt her on “compassionate or humanitarian” grounds and allow her 
to remain in Canada while submitting her application. She was denied. 
Baker sought judicial review of this decision and argued that the duty of fairness 
owed towards her had not been fulfilled. She alleged that several specific procedures 
were required under her circumstances: an oral interview before the decision-maker, 
notice to her children and other parent of the interview, a right for the children and the 
other parent to make submissions at that interview, notice to the other parent of the 
interview and of that person’s right to have counsel present, and for the provision of 
reasons.209 An immigration officer had provided a written memorandum to another 
officer that was riddled with comments about her lifestyle-choices, mental illness, her 
children, and bias statements towards immigrants in general, which she argued were not 
the type of reasons required by procedural fairness. The SCC held that officer had taken 
the correct considerations into account in regards to the procedures afforded to Baker. 
Because of this, the Court did not interfere with the types of procedures provided. 
Specifically, she was not entitled to an oral hearing nor many of the types of notice she 
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requested, and that she had been provided with reasons. The memo, despite its 
unprofessional tone, clear bias, and poor organization, provided the ‘reasons’ owed to 
Baker. (The Court did, however, ultimately hold that the duty of fairness had not been 
upheld due to the apprehension of bias present within the reasons. This is further 
discussed below.) 
The significance of this case lies not in its facts or outcome, but in the Court’s 
articulation of the law governing the considerations to be taken into account when 
determining the content of the duty of fairness in a given situation. Justice L’Heureux-
Dube prescribed five non-exhaustive criteria.210 The first is the nature of the decision 
being made and the process followed in making it. L’Heureux-Dube explains that the 
more the process resembles “judicial decision making, the more likely it is that 
procedural protections closer to the trial model will be required by the duty of 
fairness.”211 Trials provide plaintiffs with significant procedural rights, including the right 
to an oral trial, the right to provide evidence, the right to reasons (in the form of a 
judgment). The second factor is the nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of the 
statute pursuant to which the body operates. For example, this could include whether or 
not an appeal process is provided for by the statute. Huscroft explains that “[e]nhanced 
procedural protection may be required if a second level of proceedings is envisaged, in 
order to allow for meaningful participation in those proceedings. For example, the 
existence of a right of appeal is an important consideration in deciding whether and to 
what extent reasons for a first-level decision are required.”212 A right to appeal may also 
indicate a higher level of participation in order to ensure that all of the relevant facts are 
                                                
210 Baker, supra note 206 at paras 23-27. 
211 Baker, supra note 206 at 23. 
212 Huscroft, supra note 153 at 168. 
 77 
submitted to the original trier of fact. The third is the importance of the decision to the 
individual or individuals affected. The content of the duty of fairness increases in 
proportion to the importance of the particular decision to the person it affects – the “more 
important the decision is to the lives of those affected and the greater its impact on that 
person or those persons, the more stringent the procedural protections that will be 
mandated.”213 Infringements of a constitutionally protected right are highly significant.  
Fourth, the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision may 
also influence the duty of fairness. If an individual has a “legitimate expectation that a 
certain procedure will be followed, this procedure will be required by the duty of 
fairness.”214 Huscroft explains that these legitimate expectations could arise out of 
conduct such as “representations, promises, or undertakings of past practice or current 
policy of a decision-maker.”215 Public comments, political promises, or past practices 
about environmental undertakings would be relevant. Fifth and finally, the choices of 
procedure made by the decision-maker itself, particularly when the statute leaves to the 
decision-maker the ability to choose its own procedures, or when the decision maker has 
specific expertise in determining what procedures are appropriate in the circumstances 
should also be taken into account. This fifth factor most likely cause the greatest 
difficulties for section 7 plaintiffs, as it “calls for a measure of deference to the 
[administrative decision-maker’s] choice of procedure.”216 Courts and applicants must 
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respect the fact that decisions may need to be made “within a reasonable time frame and 
at a reasonable cost.”217 
There are several implications arising from the Baker test. As noted above, the 
Court has repeatedly held that what is required by the duty of fairness will always “be 
decided in the context of the statute involved and the rights affected.”218 Given that the 
impact(s) of a given decision and the type of procedures necessary will vary from case to 
case and plaintiff to plaintiff, it is difficult to establish a ‘benchmark’ against which the 
level of procedures granted in a single case can be weighed. Moreover, the Court has 
been clear that the Baker approach “’should not be seen as reducing the level of 
deference given to decisions of a highly discretionary nature’ and… that any ministerial 
obligation to consider certain factors ‘gives the applicant no right to a particular outcome 
or the application of a particular legal test.’”219 Generally, if the Court determines that a 
decision maker has considered the appropriate factors, then the substantive decision is 
more likely to be upheld even if the Court would have “weighed the factors differently 
and arrived at a different conclusion.”220  
That said, the (albeit limited) case law where the Baker criteria were applied to 
section 7 in a non-criminal context demonstrates the significance of the third criterion – 
the importance of the decision to the individual(s) affected – when life, liberty, or 
security of the person is on the line. When security of the person is engaged, courts may 
be more likely to interfere with an administrative decision-maker’s implementation of the 
criteria and choice of procedures. The leading case is Suresh, a deportation case 
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addressing torture. In this case, the SCC held that the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration had not considered the proper Baker factors in determining the level of 
procedural fairness owed to Suresh and quashed the decision to deport. The Court then 
prescribed an explicit list of procedures required under Suresh’s circumstances: to 
provide all of the relevant information and advice to be relied upon to the affected 
individual in coming to a decision, provide the individual with the opportunity to address 
the evidence in writing, and, after considering the evidence, provide written reasons.221  
This prescriptive decision shows a significant departure from the general 
treatment of administrative decisions. Generally, following a finding that the duty of 
fairness has been breached, courts will send decisions back to the original administrative 
decision-makers and allow them to re-consider the case. However, the ruling in Suresh 
demonstrates that when a decision has the potential to negatively impact life, liberty, or 
security of the person – e.g.: through risk of imprisonment, deportation to torture, or, 
assumingly, by imposing serious health risks - and procedural fairness is not upheld, 
courts may be more willing to substantially interfere and explicitly identify the minimum 
required procedures: the right to information, the right to participate, and the right to 
reasons. Interestingly, as noted by Stewart, none of these procedures was required by 
statute in Suresh. Rather, these ‘core’ procedural elements were court-imposed to ensure 
the principles of fundamental justice were upheld.  
A word of caution: while it may be tempting to conclude from this case that 
courts will place greater emphasis on the third Baker factor – the importance of the 
decision to the individual affected – it should not be assumed that this is so. As noted by 
                                                
221 Suresh, supra note 151 at para 127. 
 80 
Huscroft, “none of the Baker criteria is, in theory, more important that any other.”222 
Purely because a constitutional interest is at stake does not necessarily mean that this 
criterion will be afforded the most weight, and will likely rely upon the strength of the 
evidence of actual risk of harm and the impact it will have.  
It is important to note that the Court in Suresh did not overrule the Minister’s 
decision, but held that Suresh was entitled to a new deportation hearing. While courts 
require decisions about the duty of fairness to be made correctly and will quash 
substantive decisions, the decision will usually be remitted to be remade in accordance 
with the appropriate procedures.”223 This is significant for applicants to note – a 
successful challenge on the basis of a breach of procedural fairness will not necessarily 
prevent a decision leading to environmental harms from being made. However, Huscroft 
argues that, once a decision has been sent back and more procedures are required,  
it may be difficult for a decision-maker to reach the same substantive decision on 
a rehearing. Fair procedures may make it easier to argue in support of particular 
substantive outcomes on a rehearing… Thus, success on an application for 
judicial review on fairness grounds may have the indirect effect of helping an 
applicant to secure a preferred substantive outcome. At the very least, it will give 
the applicant another chance to obtain that outcome, and ensures that the 
substantive decision will be made on a well-informed basis”.224  
 
A reasonable apprehension of bias 
Another important component of procedural fairness that is described in Baker is the 
requirement that decisions be made free from a reasonable apprehension of bias. After the 
Court’s discussion of the five factors, the L’Heureux-Dube J. states that procedural 
fairness “also requires that decisions be made free from a reasonable apprehension of bias 
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by an impartial decision-maker.” Despite the Court’s finding that the proper procedures 
had taken place, Mavis Baker had, the court held, been denied procedural fairness 
because of the clear bias held against the plaintiff in officer’s memo. The Court held that 
the officer demonstrated a “reasonable apprehension of bias”, in that a “reasonable and 
well-informed member of the community would [not] conclude that he had approached 
this case with the impartiality appropriate to a decision made by an immigration 
officer.”225 This bias demonstrated in the officer’s memo led the court to conclude that 
the decision was unreasonable and was sent back. From this, it can be concluded that a 
reasonable apprehension of bias by a decision maker would violate the principles of 
fundamental justice. 
Moving beyond the minimum requirements 
Collins asserts that that “since content of the principles of the principles of fundamental 
justice is context-specific, it is reasonable to assume that the case of state-sponsored 
environmental harm may implicate a unique set of procedural protections.”226 Reading 
Baker and Suresh together, plaintiffs are able to advocate for additional procedures 
beyond the minimum related to administrative decisions, or for specific ways in which 
notice, participation, and reasons can be provided. The SCC provided extra procedures in 
G(J). In this child-custody case, Lamer C.J. held that “in some circumstances, depending 
on the seriousness of the interests at stake, the complexity of the proceedings, and the 
capacities of the parent, the government may be required to provide an indigent parent 
with state-funded counsel.”227 This ruling may be relied upon to argue that environmental 
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applicants who have had their section 7 rights engaged, either through actual harm or the 
risk of harm, may be owed certain procedures in order to uphold the principles of 
fundamental justice. 
Gage provides a list of suggested procedures that he argues ought to apply in the 
context of public health risks, which may, as noted by Collins, also apply individuals 
affected by projects subject to regulatory approval.228  Indeed, Collins suggests that the 
plaintiffs in Kelly ought to argue for the procedures below should they proceed with a 
section 7 claim.229 Most are related to notice, information, and participation, but Gage 
also provides examples of ways that those procedures might be provided. These 
suggestions are reiterated here, with additional examples of how those procedures could 
apply to a regulatory decision: 
1. Notice and information – Depending on the severity of the impact, this could 
occur at one or both of these points in time: prior to a decision likely to cause a 
negative impact, and after the decision has been made so that preventative or 
mitigative actions may be taken; 
2. Participation in appropriate decision-making processes – Consultation may 
include the ability to provide written or oral submissions, the right to call 
evidence,230 or a chance to respond to the facts that an administrative decision-
maker may rely upon to come to a decision through a “designated period when the 
proposed decision will be available for review and comment”;231  
3. Exercise precaution – administrative decision-makers may be required to 
implement the precautionary principle when making a decision; 
4. Informed assessment of risks – Communicate the connection between the decision 
and its potential impact on individuals; and 
5. An unbiased decision-maker – Ensure safeguards are in place to prevent a 
decision-maker from deriving any personal benefit for a particular decision to 
“ensure that institutions exercise their powers in a fair and unbiased manner.”232 
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Referring to societal values to inform procedural fairness 
The SCC has made some strong comments regarding the duty of fairness in an 
environmental context, which may be an additional consideration outside of the Baker 
factors. This was demonstrated in Canadian Pacific, a section 7 case where the Court 
implied that societal values – in particular, that the protection of the environment is 
fundamental to Canadian values – should inform fair procedures. In this case, the accused 
was charged with releasing toxic substances into the environment contrary to a 
prohibition against the release of pollution “of the natural environmental for any use that 
can be made of it” under the Environmental Protection Act.233 He claimed that the regime 
provided by the legislation was procedurally unfair in that it was overly broad and did not 
provide fair notice to citizens of prohibited conduct. The Court disagreed, ruling that the 
protection of the environment is a “well-known societal value”, and that the accused was 
required to read this value into the legislative scheme. Had he done so, he would have 
understood that fumes and damage resulting from an uncontrolled burn would reasonably 
have triggered the offence.  
While Canadian Pacific is distinguishable from the application of section 7 
discussed in this thesis in that the content of the procedures was interpreted to benefit the 
government as opposed to the individual (i.e., the Court was interpreting legislation 
already concerned with environmental protection, not reading a need for environmental 
protection into a decision-making process), the case nevertheless demonstrates that 
broader societal values are a factor to be considered in determining the content of fair 
procedures. Moreover, the SCC recognizes that environmental protection is such a value. 
If the average citizen is expected to turn to societal values to be adequately informed 
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about the content of procedural fairness, then it is arguable that government decision 
makers, particularly those in the environmental sector, ought to be held to the same 
standard. While it may be difficult to demonstrate that a government decision maker did 
not take environmental protection into account in a given situation or to quantify how 
Canadian Pacific builds upon the duty of fairness in government decision-making, the 
case could ne used to support the argument that any reasons rendered for a decision must 
reflect a consideration of the environment.  
In summary, it appears that the most likely role for section 7 in an environmental 
context is a procedural one. All actions taken by administrative decision makers involved 
in regulatory approval processes are matters within the authority of government and are 
subject to the Charter, and individuals directly affected by those processes should be able 
to challenge any unconstitutional behavior. To be unconstitutional under section 7, the 
decision must be connected to a potential infringement of the right to security of the 
person. These circumstances may be limited, and will most likely occur if there are 
serious risks to human health. While this is not an impossibly high threshold, there still 
must be a level of scientific certainty demonstrating that the harm does, in fact, exist and 
that the infliction of the harm is related to the approval process. This connection will 
establish an infringement of the right to security of the person. 
The most probable manner that an administrative decision can infringe the 
principles of fundamental justice is by failing to provide procedural fairness. When an 
infringement of security of the person is present, the affected individuals must be notified 
of the risk, allowed to participate in the decision-making process, and be provided with 
rational reasons regarding any final decision. Additional procedural protections may also 
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be argued for, such as the implementation of the precautionary principle, even if the 
legislative scheme in question does not require it. However, whatever additional 
procedures provided beyond the minimum requirements of notice, participation, and 
reasons will vary case by case and, due to the repeated emphasis by the courts that the 
content of procedural fairness is case specific, cannot be anticipated in advance. 
The above conclusion does not necessarily mean that approvals connected to 
environmental harm will not be still granted or that broader environmental protection 
methods will be put in place. However, additional procedural safeguards can help ensure 
that any decision made is a responsible one, taking the needs of individuals into 
consideration. Without section 7, such procedural protections could be lawfully bypassed. 
Step 4: After section 7 
i) Section 1 – Justifying infringement of environmental protection 
A Charter analysis does not end once a claimant has established an infringement of their 
protected right. Section 1, which provides that the rights and freedoms set out in the 
Charter are guaranteed “only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society,” grants the government a chance 
to defend their impugned action. In Oakes, the SCC set out a four-part test for 
government defendants seeking to defend their rights-infringing action.234 This test 
applies to all Charter rights, including section 7. On a balance of probabilities, the 
government must demonstrate that the impugned action satisfies four criteria. First, there 
must be a sufficiently important objective to justify limiting a Charter right. Second, there 
must be a rational connection between the law or action and the objective. Third, the right 
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must not be impaired any more than is necessary to accomplish the objective. Fourth, the 
law or action must not have a disproportionately severe effect on the persons to whom it 
applies.235 
Case law coming out of the courts generally asserts that s. 1 should not present a 
serious obstacle for section 7 litigants and, while important to take note of, s. 1 will not 
likely play a very big role in a section 7 claim. Interestingly, the test for a s. 1 defence 
appears to contain several of the elements of the section 7 analysis relating to the 
principles of fundamental justice. Step two, a rational connection, must satisfy the rule 
against arbitrariness. Step three, a requirement that the right now be impaired anymore 
than is necessary, is similar to the rule against overbreadth. Step four, the requirements 
that the law not have a disproportionately severe test, reflects the same value contained in 
the rule against grossly disproportionate laws. If any of these three substantive principles 
of fundamental justice have been successfully argued by the plaintiff in their section 7 
argument, then there would be strong grounds to assume that the government defendant 
would not be able to defend their action under section 1. Indeed, the SCC has noted on 
several occasions that, due to the limiting role of the principles of fundamental justice, 
any matter that violates section 7 is unlikely to be justifiable under section 1. The Court 
took explicit note of this in Chaoulli, and explains that matters that are found to be 
arbitrary or overbroad will rarely, if ever, be able to pass the “rational connection” step, 
and laws that are grossly disproportionate are unlikely to pass the branch of the test 
requiring a balance between the overall benefits and the deleterious effects.236   
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However, given the conclusion reached in this thesis that the most applicable 
principle of fundamental justice is procedural fairness due to the difficulties presented by 
the rules against arbitrariness, overbreadth, and gross disproportionality in an 
environmental context, failure of the section 1 at step two, three, or four cannot be relied 
upon. If a claim cannot be rooted in arbitrariness, overbreadth, or gross 
disproportionality, then it is reasonable to assume that the government’s defence will pass 
each of the final three components of the section 1 test. Thus, an argument on behalf of 
government rooted in the first grounds for defending an action – a sufficiently important 
objective to justify infringing a Charter right – must be anticipated.  
Section 1 jurisprudence related to the “sufficiently important objective” part of 
the Oakes tests assists with clarifying the relationship between section 1 and section 7. 
This first part of the test demonstrates that section 7 does not require a balance between 
the interests of society at large with the interests of the individual whose section 7 
interests have been infringed. In Bedford, McLachlin C.J. explains that  
Section 7 and s. 1 work in different ways. Under s. 1, the government bears the 
burden of showing that a law that breaches an individual’s right can be justified 
having regard to the government’s goal… By contrast, under section 7, the 
claimant bears the burden of establishing that the law deprives her of life, liberty 
or security of the person in a manner that is not connected to the law’s object… 
An arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly disproportionate impact on one person suffices 
to establish a breach of section 7. To require section 7 claimants to establish the 
efficacy of the law versus its deleterious consequences on members of society as a 
whole, would impose the government’s s. 1 burden on claimants under section 7. 
That cannot be right.237 
 
Alastair Lucas nevertheless warns that plaintiffs should anticipate that “a range of factors 
including economic and other public objectives may be weighed by the court.”238 These 
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are considerations that have been explicitly excluded by courts from the section 7 
analysis, but can resurface here. The Newfoundland Court of Appeal Labrador Inuit 
Association (although note that it is not a constitutional case), comments on the need to 
balance environmental interests with economic interests. Marshall, Steele, and Green J.J. 
explain that “important as are environmental considerations, sight cannot be lost of the 
economic and social benefits that flow from the production of these resources. Legitimate 
concerns of meaningful employment and security for families are at stake. This is a 
reality that must also be taken into account along with environmental considerations. The 
importance of development of resources to the lives of people should not be understated. 
It, and the investment that brings it about, are essential to the well-being and progress of 
society.”239 
Given that no section 7 cases have moved past the part of the analysis requiring 
causation, it is unclear how the court would balance the impacts on individuals related to 
environmental impacts with the economic concerns highlighted in Labrador Inuit 
Association. However, given the SCC has repeatedly asserted that a law that violates the 
principles of fundamental justice is unlikely to tip the scale for step one in the 
government’s favour,240 plaintiffs should be able to be relatively confident that if they are 
able to successfully demonstrate that there has been a section 7 violation, section 1 
should not interfere with that success. 
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ii) Subsections 52(1) & 24(1) – Repeals and remedies 
Subsections 52(1) and 24(1) provide the options available following a finding of 
unconstitutionality. First, under subsection 52(1) unconstitutional laws are to be declared, 
to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. Similarly, administrative 
decisions that are unconstitutional will be overturned. The Board’s decision to authorize 
the sour gas wells in Kelly, for example, would no longer be valid.  
For a declaration of unconstitutionality, a claimant does not need to demonstrate 
that they have suffered any identifiable harm. However, an applicant who has suffered 
harm can apply for a remedy under subsection 24(1). It provides that “[a]nyone whose 
rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may 
apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers 
appropriate and just in the circumstances.” Constitutional remedies under subsection 
24(1), such as damages, are only available to individuals and not corporate identities. 
Thus, it may not be lucrative for a corporate entity to challenge past government 
behaviour if the entity has no interest in stopping the behaviour, as the entity will not be 
able to receive compensation. 
An analysis of the different sorts of available remedies is beyond the scope of this 
paper; however, common remedies include damages and equitable remedies, such as 
injunctions. When the subject at appeal is a provision in a piece of legislation, courts will 
also often issue a declaration of invalidity that is suspended for a certain period of 
time.241 This provides the government with an opportunity to “craft an appropriate 
                                                
241 For example, in Carter, supra note 33, the SCC issued a declaration of invalidity of the offending 
provisions of the criminal code, but suspended the declaration for 12 months to allow the Charter rights of 
patients and physicians to be reconciled with the upcoming regulatory and legislative response to the 
judgment. 
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remedy,” and then enact legislation that is consistent with any new constitutional 
parameters.242 If necessary, it may be possible for the court to provide exemption 
mechanisms to individuals still subject to the old law in the interim period.243 
With challenges to procedures fairness, however, it is most likely that the Court 
would send the decision back to the original administrative decision-maker to reconsider 
the issue while carrying out the proper procedures. 
  
                                                
242 Carter, supra note 33 at para 125. 
243 Carter, supra note 33 at para 129. 
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Chapter 5: Applying section 7 to regulatory approval processes 
Chapter four described how the elements of the section 7 legal framework apply broadly 
to the environmental. The general conclusion is that circumstances involving 
administrative decisions connected to environmental impacts may require certain 
procedural safeguards if the decision causes a sufficient risk to security of the person. 
This chapter discusses more specific applications. It provides example factual scenarios 
of the role that section 7 could play in regulatory approval processes in the environmental 
sector, and applies those scenarios to each component of the legal framework.  
Step 1: Triggering s. 32(1) 
There are numerous regulatory approval schemes that apply to decisions made across 
Canada on existing or proposed undertakings that do or may impact the environment. 
Most are concerned chiefly with the avoidance or mitigation of adverse effects. Private or 
government activities related to mining, tailings ponds, industrial waste (such as the 
discharge of contaminants into bodies of water or fume emissions), energy generation, 
resource extraction, pipeline construction, and almost any sort of development or land use 
planning initiative that may have significant environmental effects are all subject to 
governmental approval under various legislative and regulatory schemes. In Kelly, for 
example, the Energy and Utilities Board is a body that is governed by the provincial 
Energy Resources Conservation Act.244 The Board authorized the construction of the sour 
gas wells, which could lead to harmful air emissions, and was the subject of complaint. In 
Sarnia (and across Ontario), industry standards for fume emissions are set by provincial 
                                                
244 Energy Resources Conservation Act, RSA 2000, c E-10. 
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government regulations.245 Similarly, permits to discharge contaminants into bodies of 
water in Ontario (a situation not discussed in the case law examined for this thesis) are 
granted by a Director appointed by the Minister of the Environment under the 
Environmental Protection Act.246 All of these scenarios involve administrative actions.  
If an approval or authorization by government is required, subsection 32 is 
engaged. The provision refers to all matters of government authority, and thus applies 
broadly, catching final decisions as well as minor decisions made throughout an approval 
process. However, not all decisions are suitable to section 7 claims. While controversial 
environmental decisions may be made daily, only those that could have serious impacts 
to individuals, and not just the environment, should be considered. This implication is 
further explored below under causation, but is worth noting at the beginning of the 
analysis.  
Step 2: Standing 
There is a low threshold for standing, meaning that achieving individual standing should 
be relatively easy for those exposed to alleged harms. The plaintiff families in Kelly lived 
only a few kilometers downwind from the drilling site for the wells, and could be 
exposed to dangerous substances if there was a gas leak.247 The residents of the 
Aamjiwnaag First Nation in Sarnia breathe in air contaminated by industrial fumes daily. 
This provides the Aanishnaabek people with an even stronger chance of obtaining 
standing than the plaintiffs in Kelly, as the exposure has already occurred. Individuals 
living downstream from contamination discharge or near tailings ponds would also likely 
                                                
245 EPA, supra note 42, RRO 1990, Regulation 346, General – Air Pollution. 
246 EPA, supra note 42 at s 6. 
247 EUB Decision 2007-061 at 12. 
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be at risk of being exposed to any toxic substances within the discharge and are strong 
candidates for individual standing.  
In general, it should not be difficult for individuals exposed in some capacity to 
alleged adverse environmental impacts to demonstrate a direct interest in an outcome of 
an approval. The requirement that the plaintiffs have ‘some’ chance of proving a claim is 
a low threshold, and is likely met by anyone who can demonstrate a reasonable chance of 
being exposed to an alleged harm. Thus, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
the plaintiffs’ own health is at risk, this would likely demonstrate a direct interest in the 
outcome of an approval sufficient to be granted individual standing. Only exceptionally 
frivolous claims would be dismissed at this stage. Even the plaintiffs in Millership and 
Locke, who alleged section 7 violations due to white spots on their teeth, were granted 
standing. 
Step 3: An infringement of security of the person 
While triggering the Charter and achieving standing are easily accomplished, the next 
steps are more difficult. In addressing the elements of section 7 itself, the requirements 
for a strong evidentiary foundation for a claim are stringent. As noted in step one, only 
approvals that can be scientifically linked to serious harms to individuals should be 
considered. Circumstances where a plaintiff can demonstrate a connection between the 
environmental impact and the harm on a balance of probabilities may be limited. For a 
case to be successful, it must be possible to collect the requisite level of scientific proof 
(i.e., on a balance of probabilities) of significant risk of harm. This could include multiple 
considerations, such as the likelihood of an accident leading to the release of hydrogen 
sulfide, confidence in the calculation of the likelihood of an accident, likelihood of harm 
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in the event of an accident, confidence in the calculation of the likelihood of harm in the 
event of an accident, significance of harm, and confidence in the assessment of 
significance. As was seen in Dixon, this level of proof might not always exist. 
However, the standard of proof in constitutional claims is on a balance of 
probabilities, meaning that evidence demonstrating a risk of harm need not be absolute. 
The plaintiff is not required to prove that serious harms are inevitable, only that the 
chance of infringement is greater than 50%. In Kelly, the decision of the Board noted that 
contradictory evidence had been presented regarding the severity of health risks. This 
evidence would have been presented before the Court, meaning that the judges would 
have been aware of the contradictions, and yet and made the suggestion that the plaintiffs 
consider a section 7 claim nonetheless.  
To date, it appears that Kelly is the only case brought before the courts that may 
be able to meet the standards for causation. According to the Court, the Board found that 
eight families living downwind from the site in an “area of above average risk” would be 
exposed to an “unacceptable risk during the drilling and completion of the wells”248 in the 
event of an accident. The wells created a “risk of death or health damage resulting from 
the release of toxic gases, including hydrogen sulfide and sulfur dioxide, as well as the 
potential for an explosion.”249 These conclusions were reached based on scientific 
evidence of the health risks associated with fumes from sour gas leaks.250 The plaintiffs 
had not yet been exposed to risks, as the wells had not yet been drilled, but the known 
connection between the risk of harm and sour gas, and the clear causal connection 
between the approval to dig the wells and the presence of the risk, meant that the facts of 
                                                
248 Kelly, supra note 36 at para 15. 
249 As paraphrased by Collins, supra note 26 at 27. 
250 EUB Decision 2007-061 at 21. 
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this case would likely meet the standard of proof for a physical infringement of security 
of the person required by section 7.  
  Cases with the most likely chance of demonstrating causation are those where 
affected individuals are directly exposed to contaminants that are known to be dangerous 
and are released following an approval or licensing process. Of the examples listed 
above, exposure to excessive industrial fumes, as in Sarnia, and contamination of water 
used by downstream residents could be likely candidates. Plaintiffs under these 
circumstances are in direct contact with contaminants that are associated with a risk of 
harm.  
Another consideration is that it is likely that the risk of exposure to a harmful 
substance (i.e., through an accident) is sufficient to make out an infringement of security 
of the person, even if the individual may not actually come into contact with the 
substance. This is in line with McLachlin C.J.’s ruling in Bedford, where the impugned 
prohibitions increased the chance that prostitutes would be exposed to harm. This rule 
would apply in Kelly, where there was no guarantee that the plaintiffs would actually be 
exposed to the fumes, as that would only happen following an accident. Tailings ponds, 
then, could be the subject of a challenge due to the risk they pose if a leak occurs, even 
though their purpose is to contain contaminants and not to discharge or release it. Thus, 
the creation of a risk tied to a possible but not inevitable accident, could infringe security 
if the person.  Given that the facts in Kelly were not eventually litigated in a section 7 
argument, it is unclear what type of evidence would be sufficient. However, factors such 
as severity of harm following exposure and industry standards and records would likely 
be considered. 
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Step 4: A violation of procedural fairness 
Approval processes can infringe security of the person. The qualifier is that the 
infringement must be done in a manner that complies with the principles of fundamental 
justice. With regulatory approvals, this most likely means that the process must be 
procedurally fair. 
The existence of an approval process does not mean that adequate procedural 
protection is in place. An example of an arguably flawed approval process is seen in the 
federal environmental assessment scheme. Under the CEAA 1995 (Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act 1995, now repealed and replaced), the approach to federal 
environmental assessments was, as explained by Meinhard Doelle  “a generally inclusive 
approach that tried to look at a broad range of adverse environmental effects of proposed 
projects.”251 Today, under CEAA 2012, the new federal environmental assessment 
legislation, the standard scope of federal environmental assessments is significantly 
narrower.252 According to Doelle, “the scope of federal [environmental assessment] has 
moved to one that is focused on a few issues within the direct regulatory authority of the 
federal governments.”253 Now, many projects bypass the requirement for a federal 
environmental assessment due to the fact that certain considerations no longer trigger 
assessment, not necessarily because the project would not have significant adverse 
effects. It appears that approvals can be granted without employing many procedural 
safeguards. 
Other regulatory schemes in Canada provide for a minimization of procedures as 
well. An attempt at procedural cutbacks was seen in Labrador Inuit Association, where 
                                                
251 Meinhard Doelle, “CEAA 2012: The End of Federal EA as We Know It?” (2012) 24 JELP 1, at 4. 
252 CEAA 2012, supra note 193. 
253 Doelle, supra note 251 at 4. 
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the Newfoundland and Labrador Minister of Environment and Labour attempted to split 
undertakings. A road and an airstrip from a larger mining project undertaking was split 
into two separate, smaller scoped, projects in order to avoid an environmental assessment 
process altogether for the road and airstrip.254 Other times, an environmental assessment 
may be initiated, but the content of the process as provided is inadequate in the opinion of 
some parties. For example, in Dixon, the plaintiffs complained that they should have been 
consulted about the wind turbines before their construction.255 However, the legislative 
scheme did not require consultation under the circumstances, and thus it did not take 
place. 
This is where the significance of section 7 for environmental purposes lies. The 
case law demonstrates that there are sound grounds for concluding that if an approval is 
linked to an infringement of security of the person, then procedural protections, 
regardless of any legislative scheme that might be in place, must be provided. Since 
Suresh, courts and academics have repeatedly stated that even the “minimal” content of 
the duty of fairness as a principle of fundamental justice when there has been as 
infringement of security of the person includes notice, participation, and reasons. While 
statutory schemes can explicitly oust the minimum requirements of the duty of fairness in 
general administrative processes, they cannot legislate away procedural fairness when 
section 7 rights have been engaged.256  
Legislative schemes that allow for certain projects to bypass environmental 
assessments, such as CEAA 2012, cannot be implemented to avoid assessment if the 
                                                
254 For example, see Labrador Inuit Association, supra note 69. 
255 Dixon, supra note 41. 
256 Slaight Communications v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038, [Slaight]; Dore v Barreau de Quebec, 2012 
SCC 12, [Dore]. 
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project poses a risk to security of the person.257 Had the plaintiffs in Dixon successfully 
demonstrated that wind turbines caused serious health risks, then the fact that they were 
not notified or able to participate in the decision making process would likely render the 
authorization to construct the wind turbine farms unconstitutional under section 7. The 
decision would likely be sent back and have to be re-considered after allowing affected 
individuals a chance to participate in the decision making process. In Kelly, where the 
plaintiffs were notified and consulted, they would also likely be entitled to reasons for the 
final decision. Before authorities grant permits to factories to discharge contaminants into 
water, or approving emission levels, they would need to inform members of the affected 
community of the decision to be made, allow those people to provide input, and make 
them aware of the final decision and of any eventual exposure they would face. The 
significance of reasons is not only to provide for a transparent decision-making process 
when section 7 rights are engaged, but also to provide individuals with a chance to appeal 
a decision if the reasons demonstrate that the decision was flawed. 
The rule against arbitrariness may also play a role in ensuring the adequacy of the 
reasons provided as a component of procedural fairness. Given that the principles of 
fundamental justice do not operate in watertight components, the rule against 
arbitrariness informs the content of procedural fairness. The combined effect of 
procedural fairness and the rule against arbitrariness on the reasons provided in final 
outcomes may be one of the most significant roles for section 7 in relation to the 
environment. Any reasons provided cannot be made arbitrarily in that there must be a 
rational connection between the purpose of granting a regulatory license or approval and 
                                                
257 Unless the legislative scheme also satisfies the requirements of s. 1, discussed in Part 4 of this Chapter. 
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the actual decision rendered, based on the evidence that is adduced. Decisions could not 
be made solely to further the agenda of a single (perhaps political player. 
Plaintiffs may also be able to argue for additional procedures. If a plaintiff can 
demonstrate that the third Baker factor – the significance of the decision to the individual 
affected (i.e., the right to security of the person) – was not adequately taken into 
consideration, the content of the decision making process may have been flawed. If the 
content of a decision making process is flawed, additional procedures, such as the 
implementation of the precautionary principle, may be required in order to make the 
approval process constitutionally fair. Advocating for additional procedures may be a 
difficult argument in court, but the opportunity is there nonetheless. 
Overbreadth and arbitrariness 
It may also be possible to make out a successful arbitrariness or overbreadth argument. 
While this is much less likely than a procedural fairness argument, the substantive 
principles of fundamental justice are mentioned throughout the work of Boyd and 
Collins, and are therefore worth addressing here.  
Firstly, it appears that it would be difficult to adduce strong enough evidence to 
demonstrate a violation of the rules against arbitrariness and overbreadth. The “no 
connection” test for arbitrariness would likely fail, as there will almost always be some 
connection between an approval process and the purpose for which the approval was 
granted. For example, the purposes of the Energy Resources Conservation Act, the 
governing legislation in relation to the Kelly case, are only in relation to energy resources. 
Thus, while negative impacts to the Kelly family may be an unintended or unfortunate 
side effect of the approval of the wells, such a side effect does not necessarily frustrate 
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the overall purpose of the legislation. Therefore, a ‘no connection’ arbitrariness argument 
focusing on the effect of approving drilling operations and the purpose of the Act to 
promote the use of energy resources would likely fail. 
The “unnecessary” approach to arbitrariness is slightly more likely to be 
applicable when challenging the drilling approval decision. In this case, it may be used to 
reign in the scope of the drilling. The plaintiffs in Kelly may be able to challenge the 
decision of the Board if, while connected to the purpose of legislation, the drilling 
approval allows for a greater number of wells, and thus exposure to a higher level of risk, 
than is necessary to produce the proposed outcome. Under these circumstances, the scope 
of the approval may be seen to be is excessive (i.e., unnecessary) to meet the desired end 
and therefore violates the rule against arbitrariness. 
As noted in chapter 3, the unnecessary approach to arbitrariness can have a 
similar application to the rule against overbreadth. Overbreadth, like arbitrariness, may be 
applicable to regulatory approvals in certain contexts, such as in the above example 
where the ambit of an approval might be shown to be broader than necessary to achieve 
the desired end. To use the same example as above, approvals allowing for greater levels 
of extraction or emissions than are necessary to complete a project may be overbroad, 
even if there is a rational connection between the project and the purpose. If an approved 
undertaking could have serious health risks, the scope of the project should be scoped to 
be as narrow as possible. 
However, as noted, arbitrariness and overbreadth on their own are not likely the 
ideal avenue for challenging regulatory approvals, unless the requisite proof can be 
obtained. This will be a difficult task.  
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Conclusion 
Section 7 can address procedural shortcomings of regulatory approval schemes that do 
not adequately address and prevent adverse environmental effects even when there is a 
risk of harm to individuals. Under such circumstances, plaintiffs are likely entitled to, at 
the very least, a decision-making process that includes notice, participation, and 
meaningful reasons for a decision. In addition, these reasons should take into account and 
address any scientific evidence of potential adverse environmental impacts that contribute 
to the alleged harm. If these were not provided, or if the reasons demonstrated that the 
risk to their security of the person was not properly considered, the decision would likely 
violate the principles of fundamental justice and be overturned due to its 
unconstitutionality. 
A potential lasting effect of such a decision, if it were to go to the SCC, would be 
to constitutionalize the minimum requirements of regulatory approval processes where 
the result of the approval results in a risk to security of the person, regardless of the 
overarching legislative scheme. By qualifying the minimum requirements (notice, 
participation, and non-arbitrary reasons) and overriding the general rule that procedural 
fairness can be ousted by legislation, procedural fairness under section 7 goes above the 
regular requirements of procedural fairness under administrative law. It does not matter 
whether or not there is an environmental assessment or regulatory regime in place to 
address a specific scenario. If the infringement of security of the person is there and an 
approval is required, then procedural fairness as a principle of fundamental justice 
requires certain procedures to be provided.  
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Limitations 
There are limitations to section 7 that become evident when applying the legal framework 
above under practical circumstances, as was attempted in this chapter. First, as noted 
above, section 7 can only apply when there are serious risks to the health of the 
individuals involved. While procedural fairness is a significant outcome for individuals 
subject to such risks, there may be few circumstances where these serious risks can 
actually be established (even on a balance of probabilities). Many, indeed most, 
undertakings that may have significant adverse environmental effects may not lead to 
serious risks to individuals. Exempted mining projects in areas far removed from 
individual dwellings, for example, may not have a direct impact on physical or 
psychological wellbeing. Thus, while section 7 can play an important role, the benefits of 
section 7 in an environmental context may not be very widespread.  
Second, the rights contained in section 7 do not encompass protection against 
broader environmental harms. Section 7 is not likely going to provide a certain level of 
environmental protection, or necessarily prevent exposure to the problematic 
environmental impacts. 
Third, what constitutes notice, participation, and reasons can be interpreted 
broadly. How these and any additional procedures are fulfilled will likely vary according 
to the kind of impact. Thus, it is difficult to paint a clear picture of what these procedures, 
as well as any procedures beyond the minimum requirements will look like in advance.  
Fourth, section 7 will likely only apply when physical infringements of security of 
the person can be made out. This may be fatal for plaintiffs (especially public interest 
plaintiffs) wishing to make claims rooted in issues such as climate change, ecosystem 
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degradation, or loss of biodiversity. While the effects of climate change are well 
documented, these are predominantly long terms harms that may not be able to be 
identified with sufficient directness or precision at a single point in time. Therefore, for 
more immediate arguments, these types of claims may arguably be more related to 
psychological stresses, which are more difficult to establish. While these issues are 
important, the current interpretation of section 7 is not likely the most viable way to 
address broader environmental concerns in a court of law. The requisite scientific 
evidence for demonstrating a causal connection between an approval for a certain project 
(or multiple projects, assuming that cumulative effects can be considered) and either the 
future physical harms or current levels of stress caused by climate change are likely 




Chapter 6: Further considerations  
This chapter discusses some of the additional challenges and benefits of implementing 
section 7 in relation to the environment that have not been addressed above. While there 
is overlap between these challenges, for simplicity’s sake they are divided into three 
categories. The first category relates to the doctrine of the separation of powers, in 
particular the connection between the environment and property/economic interests and 
the risk of imposing positive obligations upon government. The second category 
addresses challenges posed by the rules of administrative law and role of discretion. The 
third category describes the relationship between administrative and constitutional law.  
The Separation of Powers 
The doctrine of the separation of powers explains that state powers can be divided into 
three distinct spheres: legislative, executive, and judicial. Each branch of power “checks 
the powers of the other… [to] ensure compliance with the rule of law.”258 Asking the 
courts to compel governments to regulate the environment in a manner that delivers a 
certain outcome may be seen as overstepping judicial boundaries and taking a role that is 
inherently political. This essentially asks the courts to create or actively contribute to 
government environmental protection schemes, which is precisely the type of lawmaking 
that the doctrine of the separation of powers works to prevent.  
An example of a potential violation of the separation of powers was seen in 
Chaoulli. McLachlin C.J.’s decision in this case has received much criticism for going 
beyond the role of the courts and making an inherently political decision about the 
                                                
258 The Honourable Chief Justice John D. Richard, “Separation of Powers: The Canadian Experience” 47 
Duq L Rev 731. 
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“supposed ability of the government to attain its objectives,”259 namely, how to govern 
health care. The merits of transferring the power to make law from democratically elected 
legislative institutions to unelected judges under section 7 is a highly controversial topic, 
and beyond the scope of this paper, but is an issue that environmental section 7 applicants 
should bear in mind. 
In reference to the environmental case law discussed in Chapter 3, it is important 
to note that the courts did not, in any of these cases, impose environmental values onto 
otherwise unrelated areas of law. In Oldman River, Spraytech, and Canfor, despite 
commenting on the need for environmental protection, the observations regarding the 
environment were not in relation to the ultimate questions of law before the court and, 
thus, did not contribute to the decisions reached and are therefore obiter only. For 
example, despite the Court’s strong opening statements in Spraytech regarding the 
common future of Canadians and the need for environmental protection, L’Heureux-
Dube immediately clarified that, regardless of the potential for environmental threats 
posed by the pesticides, the legal question to be decided was about whether creating 
regulations about pesticide use was within the jurisdiction of the municipality. The need 
for a healthy environment was not sufficient to establish or overrule the municipality’s 
power to regulate pesticide use in the manner it saw fit. In Sault Ste Marie, Hydro-
Quebec, Labrador Inuit Association, and Canadian Pacific, the pith of the impugned 
pieces of legislation was in relation to the environment itself. Thus, the Court was able to 
rely on the need for environmental protection to justify its decisions because the 
government bodies in these cases had explicitly decided to create environmental 
                                                
259 Jeremy Webber, “Section 7, Insite, and the Competence of the Courts” (2010-2011) 19 Const F 125 at 
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protection legislation and subject themselves to judicial review on these matters. Thus, 
these cases do not demonstrate unwarranted interference by the Court with the 
environment or an infringement of the separation of powers.  
Positive obligations 
Related to the separation of powers, there are problems when plaintiffs seek to use 
section 7 to require governments to take specific steps to prevent adverse environmental 
effects from arising. Indeed, both Boyd and Collins and note that difficulties may arise if 
the remedies sought require positive actions by government. The purpose of the Charter 
is to ensure that government matters do not violate the rights protected within it – as per 
section 7, not to deprive an individual of their right to life, liberty, or security of the 
person. Courts have yet to hold that the government must take active steps to promote 
those rights. Moreover, the SCC has commented numerous times that it is hesitant to 
impose positive obligations on government to actively uphold the rights to life, liberty, 
and security of the person, as this risks violating the separation of powers.  In fact, the 
Court has yet to recognize a deprivation of security of the person related to state inaction. 
In Gosselin, for example, where an applicant contended that she had a “right to a level of 
social assistance sufficient to meet basic needs”,260 the Court held that the government 
was not required to set a scheme in place to ensure her needs were met. McLachlin C.J. 
analyzed the content of the rights to life, liberty, and security of the person, and outlines 
what, at the time of this paper, remains the current state of the law in regards to positive 
obligations under section 7: 
Section 7 speaks of the right not to be deprived of life, liberty and security of the 
person… Nothing in the jurisprudence thus far suggests that section 7 places a 
                                                
260 Gosselin, supra note 133. 
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positive obligation on the state to ensure that each person enjoys life, liberty or 
security of the person. Rather, section 7 has been interpreted as restricting the 
state’s ability to deprive people of these [rights]… 
 
In this case, the Court held that the government was not obliged to uphold Gosselin’s 
security of the person by providing her with a “particular level”261 of social assistance. 
Thus, it may be difficult to argue that section 7 imposes an obligation to uphold a 
particular level of environmental protection. Gosselin favours the procedural approach 
over a substantive argument, which avoids imposing an obligation on the court to define 
a minimum level of substantive health. 
 That said, McLachlin C. J. leaves open the possibility that under “special 
circumstances”, “section 7 may be interpreted to include positive obligations [and that it] 
would be a mistake to regard section 7 as frozen, or its content as having been 
exhaustively defined in previous cases.”262 The failing point of the argument for Gosselin 
was not necessarily a reluctance of the court to proceed in a certain direction, but a lack 
of compelling evidence to “warrant a novel application of section 7 as the basis for a 
positive state obligation to guarantee adequate living standards.”263 However, there is 
little guidance in the case law of what the special circumstances referred to in Gosselin 
may be, the strength of evidence required, or what types of factors ought to inform them. 
A potentially strong argument may be to argue that when there is a significant risk of 
harm, the government has a positive obligation to perform an environmental impact 
assessment.264 
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Negative impacts to property & economic interests 
Another complicating factor for environmental section 7 claims is the intrinsic 
connection between the environment and land, and, therefore, economic and property 
interests. This connection raises concerns not only because property rights are not 
explicitly covered by section 7, but also because parliament has historically taken a 
“principled objection” against entwining constitutional and economic rights.265 This is 
demonstrated by the fact that property rights are explicitly mentioned in the Bill of 
Rights, and, just as intentionally, are left out of the Charter. The Court has taken explicit 
notice of Parliament’s intention to keep property rights and the constitution separated 
when interpreting section 7. In Manicom, for example, the Ontario High Court of Justice 
notes, “section 7 of the Charter does not provide specific protection for property rights. It 
is well known that the omission of the word “property” from the section was deliberate 
when the Charter was enacted.”266 In this case, the Court struck out the plaintiff’s 
statement of claim because only harm to property, as opposed to a detriment to health, 
was pleaded.  
Even the Court’s environmentally friendly ruling in Canfor appears to be of little 
assistance here. In this case, the Court referred to the “intrinsic value” of the trees that 
had been burned down due to Canfor’s negligence. However, this value was still in 
relation to the Crown’s interest as a landowner and contributed to the economic damages 
incurred by the Crown following the fire. Thus, Canfor actually reinforces the connection 
between the environment – even its “intrinsic”, non-numerical value – and property. The 
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more the environment is connected to property interests, the less likely courts are to 
interfere when the Charter is involved. 
Environmental applicants, then, ought to be cautious with how their section 7 
claims are framed. The purpose of the Charter is to protect individual rights and makes 
no reference to the environment. By advocating for a right to a healthy or safe 
environment, the issue is framed as one relating to the physical land, water, and air that 
surrounds a claimant – in essence, either a right to property or to a certain quality of 
property, or a restriction on the property rights of others, including the Crown. 
Furthermore, a substantive environmental rights approach requires courts to consider 
trade-offs between environmental and economic interests, which is a decision that ought 
to be determined by the legislatures.  
Despite these concerns, it is worth considering Arbour J’s dissent in Gosselin. She 
distinguishes economic rights that are fundamental to human life and survival from 
economic rights of a more commercial or corporate variety that are more akin to property 
rights. She proposes that rights that are fundamental to human life and survival can be 
“readily accommodated under the section 7 rights… without the need to constitutionalize 
‘property’ rights or interests.”267 It may be argued that clean water and air are not purely 
related to property, but are integral to human life and security of the person. Negative 
impacts to these elements may be connected to negative impacts on security of the 
person. However, a majority of the Court has yet to rule in favour of this idea. 
                                                
267 Gosselin, supra note 133 at para 311. 
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Challenges posed by Administrative Law 
The above challenges posed by the separation of powers and positive obligations may be 
best avoided by focusing a section 7 argument on procedural fairness. Procedural 
fairness, in a sense, imposes positive obligations upon government as it requires certain 
steps to be taken. However, the distinction is that it does not require a specific 
government program or scheme be implemented to uphold a right. Rather, it requires a 
fair procedure if a decision that is already being made carries the risk of infringement. 
Thus, it is not a free-standing positive obligation, but a requirement for due process for 
government-initiated actions. For example, while courts have been reluctant to impose 
substantive regimes or levels of protection, as was the case in Gosselin, the Court’s ruling 
in Suresh, a case involving deportation to torture, demonstrates a willingness to dictate 
specific procedural requirements when section 7 is engaged in an administrative context.  
Despite the assertion that the most applicable venue for success is through a 
procedural fairness argument, there are elements specific to administrative law that 
complicate using section 7 to challenge decisions of administrative decision-makers. The 
rules governing standards of review for administrative decisions are complex and beyond 
the scope of this paper, but the key factor is deference.268 In Dunsmuir, the leading case 
on standard of review, the SCC explains that “deference requires respect for the 
legislative choices to leave some matters in the hands of administrative decision makers, 
for the processes and determinations that draw on particular expertise and experiences, 
and for the different roles of the court and administrative bodies within the Canadian 
                                                
268 See Audrey Macklin, “Chapter 9: Standard of Review: Back to the Future?”3 in particular Part VIII, 
“Review of Standard of Review: I laughed, I cried, I Stood on my chair and…” in Flood & Sossin, supra 
note 153 at 319. 
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constitutional system.”269 Courts are much less hesitant to interfere with a decision or 
action of an administrative decision-maker than they are with those of the legislatures, 
especially if they are asked to review a question of fact. In many circumstances, courts 
are willing to grant deference in their decisions regardless of whether they would have 
come to a different conclusion had they considered the issue themselves. In these 
circumstances, courts will only interfere if the decision was unreasonable. As the Court 
asserts in Southam, an “unreasonable decision is one that, in the main, is not supported by 
any reasons that can stand up to a somewhat probing examination. Accordingly, a court 
reviewing a conclusion on the reasonableness standard must look to see whether any 
reasons support it. The defect, if there is one, could presumably be on the evidentiary 
foundation itself or in the logical process by which conclusions are sought to be drawn 
from it” (emphasis added).270 
In the case of regulatory approvals, the fact-finding process generally takes place 
in front of various responsible authorities or review panels. Kelly illustrates the 
importance of adducing adequate evidence of harm during original fact-finding hearings, 
as courts are hesitant to overturn findings of fact. A primary reason that the court was 
willing to consider the section 7 claim was because the Board had already concluded, 
based on evidence brought by the Kellys, that a serious risk of harm was present. In 
contrast, in Domke (another section 7 case involving sour gas wells) the applicants argued 
to the Alberta Court of Appeal that the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board erred in a 
factual assessment of risk.271 The Court declined to review the facts, and held that “the 
                                                
269 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, [2008] 1 SCR 190, [Dunsmuir], at para 49. 
270 Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Southam In [1997] SCR 748, 1997 CanLII 385, at 
para 56, referred to in Baker, supra note 206 at para 63. 
271 Domke, supra note 91. 
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assessment is fact laden and involves the [Board]’s core expertise. At any appeal hearing 
it would be entitled substantial deference.”272 
Questions of law, as opposed to questions of fact, may receive less deference. If 
an administrative decision-maker has incorrectly applied the relevant law in a decision-
making process – for example, by failing to apply the correct Baker factors – then Courts 
are more likely to interfere with a decision. This interference can range from the Courts 
overturning the decision completely and replacing it with a decision of their own, to 
sending the decision back to the administrative decision-maker for reconsideration using 
the correct legal tests. However, as stated, determining the correct standard of review 
comes down to more than just the type of decision in question. An analysis of the dense 
area of law regarding the standard of review, even when applied to a single circumstance, 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The relationship between constitutional and administrative law 
The Baker factors and other rules of administrative law apply to all government 
decisions, regardless of whether or not there is a constitutional interest at stake. Thus, it 
may appear that framing a section 7 claim in an administrative context would not provide 
any protections beyond those already afforded under the general duty of fairness. 
However, there are some additional requirements that enhance the protections afforded 
by the duty of fairness once section 7 is engaged. This section outlines some of the 
benefits associated with an administrative argument that incorporates constitutional 
principles.  
                                                
272 Domke, supra note 91 at 27. 
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 First, as mentioned above, procedural fairness cannot be ousted by legislation if a 
constitutional interest is at stake. Generally, the legislatures can prescribe the specific 
procedures that administrative decision-makers are required to follow, and, conversely, 
can relieve them of performing others, such as notice, participation, or reasons. While in 
Suresh the court explained that these procedures were generally the minimum contents of 
procedural fairness, the extent to which they are enforceable, particularly the duty to give 
reasons, depends on the case at hand and the legislative scheme at play. For example, in 
Baker, the SCC explains that while “in certain circumstances, the duty of procedural 
fairness will require the provision of a written reason for a decision … the traditional 
position at common law has been that the duty of fairness does not require, as a general 
rule, that reasons be provided for administrative decisions.”273 
However, if a decision made under such a legislative scheme affects section 7 
interests, then it appears that the minimum procedures must be undergone, even in the 
face of an explicit statutory exemption. When a decision has an important significance for 
the individual or when there is a right of appeal – both of which are met when 
constitutional interests are at stake – reasons will be required.274 Thus, a set of facts that 
demonstrates an infringement of security of the person creates a categorical exclusion to 
an administrative scheme that would not be available under administrative law, but only 
exists once the Charter is triggered.  
A second benefit to framing a procedural argument as a Charter claim is the 
integration of the rule against arbitrariness. The rule reigns in the deference afforded to a 
final decision and substantivizes the manner in which the procedures provided are carried 
                                                
273 Baker, supra note 206 at para 37 & 43. 
274 Baker, supra note 206 at para 43. 
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out. Thus, not only must reasons be provided, as per Baker, but the content of those 
reasons must reflect a non-arbitrary decision that is based on proper weight and 
consideration of the relevant factors. Generally, as noted above, in Southam, an 
unreasonable decision under the regular rules of administrative law is “one that, in the 
main, is not supported by any reasons that can stand up to a somewhat probing 
examination.”275 In the case of regulatory approvals, any economic benefit of a project 
might suffice.  However, the unnecessary approach to arbitrariness and the rule against 
overbreadth require more from a decision than that it not be unreasonable in the manner 
described in Southam. A rational connection between decisions and all of the sound 
evidence adduced is likely required. This does not guarantee a specific outcome; 
therefore, a project may not be overturned despite a presence of serious harm. But, a 
decision may need to demonstrate that there are no unnecessary (i.e., arbitrary) 
components of a project. Decisions will likely have to reflect a careful consideration of 
any clear scientific evidence of harm or risk and the potential impacts on individuals that 
are adduced in order to justify the parameters of a project.  
Moreover, the SCC suggests in Baker that reasons reflect must not only the 
purpose of the statutory scheme and the evidence as presented, but also interests that are 
“central… values in Canadian society.”276 L’Heureux-Dube read into the Immigration 
Act that the needs and interests of children were central to humanitarian and 
compassionate values. Reasons provided in Charter-triggering environmental decisions, 
then, should reflect the environmental values that are fundamental to Canadian society 
that have been referenced by the Court for decades. 
                                                
275 Southam, supra note 270 at para 56. 
276 Baker, supra note 206. 
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 Finally, constitutional rights are indispensably linked to the rule of law.277 
According to Craik et al., at a minimum, under the rule of law “even the most powerful 
state organs and official are subordinate to the law. They may not act according to their 
simple wishes and desires, but must act in compliance with the law.”278 In Roncarelli, the 
SCC explains that the rule of law limits statutory powers to the “express or implied 
purposes for which they were granted,”279 and that if ”an administration according to law 
is to be superseded by action dictated by and according to the arbitrary likes, dislikes and 
irrelevant purposes of public officers acting beyond their duty, [this] would signalize the 
beginning of disintegration of the rule of law as a fundamental postulate of our 
constitutional structure.”280 The rule of law, which has similarities to the rule against 
arbitrariness, imposes a duty of “good faith in acting with a rational appreciation of [the] 
intent and purpose [of the legislation] and not with an improper intent.”281 Thus, under 
the rule of law, administrative decision-makers making environmental decisions must act 
in a manner that upholds the purpose of the legislation under which they obtain their 
power. In Canada, this power often comes from environmental legislation that is based in 
a need for environmental protection: the Preamble and Purposes under s. 4(1) of the 
CEAA 2012 refer to the protection of the environment from significant adverse 
environment effects;282 a purpose of the Environmental Protection Act is to provide for 
the protection and conservation of the natural environment;283 to name a few. These 
                                                
277 The preamble to the Charter, supra note 9 states that “Canada is founded upon principles that 
recognize… the rule of law.” 
278 Neil Craik et al, Public Law: Cases, Material, and Commentary (Second Edition) (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery Publications, 2011) at 92. 
279 Craik et al: Public law, supra note 278 at 92. 
280 Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, [Roncarelli]. 
281 Roncarelli, supra note 280. 
282 CEAA 2012, supra note 193. 
283 EPA, supra note 42. 
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purposes ought to be reflected in all actions taken under pieces of legislation like these in 
order to uphold the rule of law as a constitutional principle. For section 7 to be 
implemented, the purpose of the legislation need not be directly related to individuals. If 
an approval made under the CEAA 2012 or the Environmental Protection Act (or 
otherwise) gives rise to an infringement of security of the person, then the court will be 
able to look to see if the approval is also in line with the purpose of the overarching 
legislation.284  
  
                                                
284 CEAA 2012, supra note 191; EPA, supra note 42. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Summary of findings 
Many of the adverse environmental impacts of concern to Canadians are linked to 
projects that interfere with the environment, and the government is often within an arms 
length of these projects. Environmental legislation and regulations, contracts where the 
government is a party, and decisions of administrative-decision makers are all matters 
within the authority of government, and must comply with the Charter. Should these 
actions affect an individual directly or if the individual has a genuine interest in the 
outcome, that individual will likely be able to achieve standing and challenge the decision 
at a court of law. 
 Scientific evidence of serious risks of physical harm to human health on a balance 
of probabilities would demonstrate a negative impact on an individual’s right to security 
of the person. While what exactly constitutes serious harm in the context of adverse 
environmental effects is unclear, there are a few guiding factors provided in the case law. 
Actual harm need not have arisen, demonstrating that a true health risk arises due to the 
environmental impact is a high threshold to meet. The case law currently demonstrates 
that it is incumbent on the plaintiff to demonstrate actual harm, not on the Crown to 
demonstrate a lack of harm. However, as demonstrated in Kelly, this does not appear to 
be an impossible burden. Sufficient causal connection between the physical interference 
with security of the person and the impugned government action will likely be present in 
regulatory approval processes, as there will have to be some sort of government 
authorization in order for harm or risk of harm to materialize. This will most likely be in 
the form of a decision from an administrative decision-making.  
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 While an infringement of security of the person on its own is not sufficient to tie 
the government’s hands, the action will be unconstitutional if it is coupled with a 
violation of the principles of fundamental justice. Procedural fairness as a principle of 
fundamental justice requires that the duty of fairness be met any time an administrative 
decision is made. Given that the minimum requirements for fairness include notice, 
participation, and reasons, this likely requires administrative decision-makers to undergo 
an unbiased regulatory approvals process whenever a project poses a risk to security of 
the person. This is a duty that cannot be ousted by legislation, including regulatory 
regimes that would otherwise provide exemptions for projects of a smaller scope. It is not 
the size or cost of a project that dictates the content of procedures, but whether the project 
poses a risk to a single individual. Baker, Suresh, and G(J) demonstrate that the required 
procedures are not necessarily limited to notice, participation, and reasons, listed above, 
and additional procedures, such as the implementation of the precautionary principle, or 
higher levels of notice, participation, or reasons may be pursued. 
 The rule of law, and the rules against arbitrariness and overbreadth, can also play 
a role in environmental decision-making. If a project authorization is unnecessarily broad 
to achieve its desired purpose, the authorization may be unconstitutionally arbitrary 
and/or overbroad. It is possible that a decision leading to environmental harms that 
“represent such a serious and imminent threat that [the] authorization under any 
circumstances violates the principle of fundamental justice” as suggested by Gage could 
stand alone as a violation of the principles of fundamental justice. It would likely pass the 
first and second steps of the Malmo-Levine test by being able to be identified as a legal 
principle – the environmental harm principle as discussed in chapter 4 – and that there is 
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significant social consensus that preventing this type of harm is fundamental to the way 
in which the legal system ought to operate. However, it may not be defined precisely 
enough for judges to be able to apply it uniformly, and without risk of rendering a policy 
decision instead of an objective judgment. 
Implications 
While a potentially effective role for section 7 has been identified in this thesis, it has 
some broader implications for the literature. Specifically, some of the proposed options in 
other works for the provision should be put aside, as such arguments are unlikely to be 
successful at court. Mainly, it is highly unlikely that broad environmental rights will 
materialize through section 7 litigation. Other venues for substantive environmental 
rights – such as a harmonized environmental bill of rights that applies across Canada - 
should be proposed and explored if that is a desired goal. Outside of section 7 and 
substantive rights, there are also other tools to be considered for the promotion of 
environmental protection, such as in relation to property/economic interests and reliance 
on Aboriginal rights and title. Such a discussion, however, particularly in regards to 
aboriginal rights, is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 Advocates seeking to rely on the approach provided in this thesis should 
recognize its limitations. Test cases most likely to be successful will be those with well-
documented connections to harm (such as sour gas) that are governed by regulatory 
schemes that provide for minimal procedures or, in some circumstances, remove the duty 
of fairness completely. Further, substantive remedies will likely only be granted in 
limited circumstances. While a best-case scenario would involve replacing a regulatory 
decision with one of the plaintiff’s choosing (which is highly unlikely), the more realistic 
 120 
expectation for successful claims is to have a decision sent back to the decision-maker to 
be re-decided on the condition that the proper procedures are implemented. 
There are also several implications for government decision makers. A first 
potential side effect is related to time. Environmental decision makers will need to look 
closely into the potential future impacts of their decisions to determine whether or not 
there will be a risk to security of the person when implementing an approval process, 
which may lengthen administrative proceedings. Lengthy processes may pose financial 
problems for government, and ultimately tax payers. However, if not done initially, future 
challenges to unfair processes could cause even further delays and, as such, it would be 
prudent to conduct the extra research at the onset of an approval process. Related, 
legislatures will need to take extra precaution to make sure legislation governing 
decision-making processes remains compliant with the Charter. They will not be able to 
legislate out notice, consultation, or the duty to give reasons when there is a serious risk 
of harm. For example, should future studies on wind turbines reveal that the plaintiffs’ 
concerns in Dixon are legitimate, then the provisions in Ontario’s Green Energy Act that 
remove consultation obligations might be subject to a Charter challenge.285 
 All in all, the conclusion reached in this thesis should not significantly prevent 
government or private industries from achieving their economic goals. Rather, it should 
promote fair, safe, and effective regulatory approval processes that deliver more desirable 
outcomes over the long term.  
                                                
285 Dixon, supra note 41; Green Energy Act, 2009, SO 2009, c 12, Sched A. 
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Moving forward: Areas for further research 
Several areas for further research are presented by the questions explored in this thesis. 
Primarily, the analysis demonstrates that there may be a policy argument – reinforced by 
the continued reference of the SCC to the environment as a fundamental value to 
Canadian society – that supports the imposition of a duty to obtain and rely upon 
scientific evidence under certain circumstances. Specifically, it may be possible to argue 
that there is, or should be, a requirement for administrative decision makers to obtain the 
relevant scientific evidence themselves and/or apply the precautionary principle if 
scientific evidence is not available when making a decision that could result in significant 
adverse environmental impacts affecting section 7 interests. While this would move 
beyond the Court’s current interpretation of the scope of section 7, there are many 
indications that Courts may be willing to move forward in this way. As mentioned, the 
Court in Gosselin explicitly left open the possibility for positive obligations under 
“special circumstances.”286 This may be an area where such special circumstances could 
arise. While the Court does not provide a clear analysis of what would be required under 
these special circumstances, it can be argued that they may be reflective of some of the 
requirements for recognizing a new principle of fundamental justice – rooted in a legal 
principle (in this case, procedural fairness), fundamental to the way in which the legal 
system ought to operate (which, arguably, includes sound environmental decision-making 
when there is a demonstrated risk of harm), and is able to be defined with sufficient 
precision to yield a manageable standard.  
                                                
286 Gosselin, supra note 133 at 83. 
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 Second, the law regarding standards of review is a rich and complex area of 
administrative law, and is an issue in most administrative decisions subject to judicial 
review. However, the application of the law to any scenario depends on the particular 
facts of the case at hand and the legislative and regulatory regimes governing the 
applicable administrative body. As such, it would not be reasonable to postpone 
conducting a full analysis on the standard of review until individual claims come forward.  
The specific requirements for the rights to notice, information, and participation 
can also be further explored. For example, could the right to notice be used to impose an 
affirmative obligation on the government to take actions to inform themselves of the risks 
of an action before it is taken (either through scientific evidence, as suggested above, or 
otherwise), or does notice only involve notification of whatever information is currently 
known? Also, procedural fairness might require the consideration of the cumulative 
effects of projects under the authority of a multitude of decision makers. It could be 
argued that there ought to be a dialogue between different heads of power to ensure that 
cumulative effects across sectors are taken into consideration. 
Additionally, the law of remedies is also robust and there may be additional types 
of remedies particularly suited to environmental applicants that could be applied for. 
Again, an adequate remedy will depend upon the individuals involved and the harms they 
have endured. 
Closing remarks 
The movement to recognize the connection between the environment and human 
rights continues in Canada. Bill C-634 will soon go through its second reading, and Boyd 
and Suzuki will continue to entice followers in their pursuit of a constitutional 
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amendment for an explicit right to a healthy environment. However, success at both of 
those approaches requires a similar time-consuming step: the passing of legislation by the 
Canadian federal government. While it is highly unlikely that section 7 of the Charter 
will bring about the type of substantive right to environmental protection envisioned by 
some activists, the approach contained in this thesis is one that is available for individuals 






Alastair R Lucas, “Natural Resource and Environmental Management: A Jurisdictional 
Primer” in Donna Tingley, ed, Environmental Protection and the Canadian Constitution: 
Proceedings of the Canadian Symposium on Jurisdiction and Responsibility for the 
Environment, (Alberta: Environmental Law Centre, 1987). 
 
Andrew Gage, "Public Health Hazards and Section 7 of the Charter" (2003) 13 J Envtl L 
& Prac 1. 
 
Andrew Stirling in “Risk, precaution and science: moving towards a more constructive 
policy debate. Talking point on the precautionary principle”, (Apr 2007) 8(4) EMBO Rep 
309-315. 
 
Anita L Morse, "Research, Writing, and Advocacy in the Law School Curriculum" 
(1982) 75 Law Libr J 232. 
 
Audrey Macklin, “Chapter 9: Standard of Review: Back to the Future?”, Part VIII, 
“Review of Standard of Review: I laughed, I cried, I Stood on my chair and…” in Flood 
& Sossin. 
 
Christopher Wren & Jill Robinson Wren, The Legal Research Manual: A Game Plan for 
Legal Research and Analysis, 2d ed (Madison, IL: Legal Education Publishers, 1986). 
 
Christopher Wren & Jill Robinson Wren, "The Teaching of Legal Research" (1988) 
80 Law Libr J 7. 
 
Colin P Stevenson “A New Perspective on Environmental Rights After the Charter” 
(1983) 21 Osgoode Hall LJ. 
 
Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, Administrative Law in Context, 2d ed (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery Publications, 2013). 
 
Dale Gibson, "Environmental Protection and Enhancement Under a New Canadian 
Constitution" in Stanley M Beck & Ivan Bernier, eds, Canada and the New Constitution: 
The Unfinished Agenda (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1983) 115. 
 
David R Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment: Revitalizing Canada's Constitution 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012). 
 




Department of Justice, Canada, "About Canada's System of Justice" (2013), online: 
Department of Justice <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/just/>. 
 125 
 
Edward L Rubin, “’Law and’ and the Methodology of Law” (1997) 521 Wis L Rev 521, 
at 547. 
 
Evan Fox-Decent & Alexander Pless, “Chapter 12 - The Charter and Administrative 
Law: Cross-Fertilization or Inconstancy?” in Flood & Sossin. 
 
Government of Canada, A Framework for the Application of Precaution in Science-Based 
Decision Making About Risk (National Library of Canada: 2003). 
 
Grant Huscroft, “From Natural Justice to Fairness: Thresholds, Content, and the Role of 
Judicial Review” (ch 5) in Flood & Sossin. 
 
Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012). 
 
Health Canada, Wind Turbine Noise and Health Study [July 2012] Environmental And 
Workplace Health < http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ewh-semt/noise-bruit/turbine-
eoliennes/index-eng.php>. 
 
J Jones, "[On Not] Taming the Information Wilderness" (2009) 9 Legal Information 
Management 53 at 54. 
 
Jeremy Webber, “Section 7, Insite, and the Competence of the Courts” (2010-2011) 19 
Const F 125. 
 
Lynda M Collins, "An Ecologically Literate Reading of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms" (2009) 26 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 7. 
 
Lynda M Collins, “Security of the person, peace of mind: a precautionary approach to 
environmental uncertainty” (2013) 4:1 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 79. 
 
Meinhard Doelle, “CEAA 2012: The End of Federal EA as We Know It?” (2012) 24 
JELP 1. 
 
Megan Bradfield, “Making Sense of the Proposed Canadian Bill of Rights”, Ecojustice, 
October 30, 2014 (online at: http://www.ecojustice.ca/blog/making-sense-of-the-
proposed-canadian-environmental-bill-of-rights). 
 
Neil Craik et al, Public Law: Cases, Material, and Commentary (Second Edition) 
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2011). 
 
P Hamilton, ‘Sarnia Takes Title for Worst Air in Canada’ [2011] Ecojustice. 
 
Paul Chynoweth, "Chapter Three: Legal Research" in Andrew Knight, ed, Advanced 
Research Methods in the Built Environment (Manchester, England: School of the Build 
Environment, University of Salford: Les Ruddock, 2008). 
 126 
 
Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed), (Scarborough: Thomson Carswell, 
2007). 
 
R Cotton and D P Emond in “Environmental Impact Assessment”, J Swaigen (ed), 
Environmental Rights in Canada (1981) 425. 
 
Robert J Sharpe & Kent Roach, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms 5th ed (Toronto: 
Irwin Law Inc, 2013). 
 
S L Simons, "Navigating through the Fog: Teaching Legal Research and Writing 
Students to Master Indeterminacy through Structure and Process" (2006) 56.3 J Legal 
Educ 356 at 356. 
 
Tanya Stern & Jessica Robinson. When and how to use Secondary Sources and 
Persuasive Authority to Research and Write Legal Documents (Washington DC: The 
Writing Centre, Georgetown University Law Center, 2004). 
 
The Honourable Chief Justice John D. Richard, “Separation of Powers: The Canadian 
Experience” 47 Duq L Rev 731. 
 
United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of 
human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and 
sustainable environment, John H. Knox” (2013), A/HRC/25/53. 
 
University of Ottawa. Faculty of Law, "Principles of Legal Research" (2011), online: 
Brian Dickson Law Library <http://web5.uottawa.ca/www2/rl-lr/eng/case-law/case-
law_canadian-abridgment.html>. 
 
University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, "Legal Research Process" (2013), online: Bora 
Laskin Law Library <http://library.law.utoronto.ca/step-2-primary-sources-law-canadian-
case-law-0>. 
 
Vincent Kazmierski, "Something to Talk about: Is there a Charter Right to Access 
Government Information?" (2009) 31 Dal LJ 351. 
 
Case law 
114957 Canada LtEe (Spraytech, Societe d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40, 
[2001] SCJ No 42. 
 
Attorney-General for Ontario v Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] AC 193. 
 
Augustus v Gosset, [1996] 3 SCR 268. 
 
 127 
Baker v Canada (Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817. 
 
Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 SCR 
307. 
 
British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd, 2004 SCC 38, [2004] 2 SCR 74. 
 
Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72. 
 
Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence 
Society, 2012 SCC 45, [2012] SCJ No 45, [2012] 2 SCR 524. 
 
Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 
SCR 134. 
 
Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Southam In [1997] SCR 748, 1997 
CanLII 385. 
 
Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] SCJ No 3, [2010] 1 SCR 44. 
 
Canadian Council of Churches v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 
[1992] 1 SCR 236. 
 
Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5. 
 
Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 SCR 791. 
 
Coalition of Citizens for a Charter Challenge v Metropolitan Authority (1993), 10 CELR 
(NS) 257 (NSSC), reversed 108 DLR (4th) 145 (NSCA). 
 
Dixon v Ontario (Director, Ministry of the Environment), 2014 ONSC 7404. 
 
Domke v Alberta (2008), 432 AR 376 (CA). 
 
Dore v Barreau de Quebec, 2012 SCC 12. 
 
Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, [2008] 1 SCR 190. 
 
Energy Probe v AG Canada (1994), 17 OR (3d) 717 (Ont Gen Div); Energy Probe v 
Canada (Attorney General) (1989), 58 DLR (4th) 513 (Ont CA). 
 
Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 SCR 3, 
[1992] SCJ No 1 (SCC). 
 
Godbout v Longueuil (Ville), [1997] 3 SCR 844 (SCC). 
 
 128 
Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84, [2002] 4 SCR 429. 
 
Imperial Oil Ltd v Quebec (Minister of the Environment), 2003 SCC 58, [2003] 2 SCR 
624. 
 
Kelly v Alberta, 2008 ABCA 52 (2008), 34 CELR (3d) 4 (Alta CA).  
 
Knight v Indian Head School Division No 19, 1990 CanLII 138 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 
653. 
 
Kuczerpa v The Queen (1993), 48 FTR 274 (FCTD), 152 NR 207 (FCA).  
 
Labrador Inuit Assn v Newfoundland (Minister of Environment and Labour), [1997] NJ 
No 223, 152 DLR (4th) 50, 25 CELR (NS) 232 (NLCA). 
 
Locke v Calgary, [1993] AJ no 926 (QB). 
 
Manicom et al v County of Oxford et al (1985), 52 OR (2d) 137 (Ont Div Ct). 
 
Millership et al. v British Columbia et al, 2003 BCSC 82. 
 
MiningWatch Canada v Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2010 SCC 2, [2010] 1 SCR 6.  
 
New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G(J), [1999] 3 SCR 46 
(SCC). 
 
O’Neill v Canada (AG) (2006), 213 CCC (3d) 389 (Ont SJ). 
 
Ontario v Canadian Pacific Ltd, [1995] 2 SCR 1031, [1995] SCJ No 62 (SCC). 
 
Operation Dismantle Inc v The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 441. 
 
R v Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd, [1988] 1 SCR 401, [1988] SCJ No 23R v Sault Ste 
Marie (City), [1978] 2 SCR 1299 (SCC). 
 
R v Demers, 2004 SCC 46, [2004] SCJ No 43. 
 
R v Hall, 2002 SCC 64. 
 
R v Heywood, [1994] 3 SCR 761, [1994] SCJ No 101 (SCC). 
 
R v Hydro-Quebec, [1997] 3 SCR 213, [1997] SCJ No 76 (SCC). 
 
R v Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3 SCR 555. 
 
R v Malmo-Levine; R v Caine, 2003 SCC 74, [2003] 3 SCR 571.  
 129 
 
R v Morales, [1992] 2 SCR 711.  
 
R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, [1988] SCJ No 1 (SCC). 
 
R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 SCR 606 at paras 639 & 642, 74 CCC 
(3d) 289. 
 
R v Sparrow, [1990 1 SCR 1075, [1990] SCJ No 49 (SCC). 
 
R v Wholesale Travel Group Inc, [1991] 3 SCR 154, [1991] SCJ No 79 (SCC).  
 
Reference re: Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 SCR 721. 
 
Reference re: s 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia), [1985] 2 SCR 486 
(SCC). 
 
Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519 (SCC). 
 
Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121. 
 
Sagen v Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter 
Games, 2009 BCCA 522, leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2009] SCCA no 459. 
 
Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 SCR 177 (SCC). 
 
Slaight Communications v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038. 
 
Smith v Inco Ltd, 2013 ONCA 724. 
 
Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] SCJ No 
3.  
 




Bill C-634, An Act to Establish and Environmental Bill of Rights, 2nd Session, 41st 
Parliament, 62-63 Elizabeth II, 2013-2014. 
 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, RSC 1985, c 16 (4th Supp). 
 130 
 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52. 
 
Class Proceedings Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 6. 
 
Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5. 
 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, SC 1996, c 19. 
 
Criminal Code, RS C 1985, c C-46. 
 
Energy Resources Conservation Act, RSA 2000, c E-10. 
 
Environmental Assessment Act, [SBC 2002] c 43. 
 
Environmental Assessment Act, RSO 1990 c E 18. 
 
Environmental Protection Act, RSO 1990, c E-19. 
 
Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/78-172, as am by SOR 93/44. 
 
Oceans Act, SC 1996 c 31. 
 
Ontario Water Resources Commission Act, RSO 1970, c 332. 
 
Security of Information Act, RSB 1985, c O-5. 
 
Other legal resources 
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 14 June 1992, UN Doc 
A/CONF 151/26 (vol 1), 31 ILM 874. 
 
Court file No. 528/10, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, between Ada Lockridge and 
Ronald Plain –and- Director, Ministry of the Environment, Her Majesty the Queen in 
Right of Ontario, (Amended) Notice of Application to Divisional Court for Judicial 





Appendix I – Legal research as a research method 
The preamble of the Charter provides that Canada is “founded upon principles that 
recognize… the rule of law”.287 The rule of law requires the “creation and maintenance of 
an actual order of positive laws,”288 meaning that the state of the law must always be able 
to be read, understood, and abided by. When presented with a legal issue, lawyers and 
legal researchers conduct legal research to determine the state of the law, and develop a 
“comprehensive analysis”289 of how the law applies to the problem as presented. It is an 
investigative method used in the legal community with the purpose of informing an 
objective legal opinion. There are many similarities between the steps taken for legal 
research for practical purposes, where a lawyer conducts research for a client to address 
an issue that the client has personally experienced, and descriptive legal research, where 
the researcher explores an unaddressed legal issue for scholarship purposes. Given that 
most readers will be at least somewhat familiar with the purpose of practical legal 
research, it is discussed in this section for illustrative purposes. For both practical and 
descriptive legal research, the purpose of the work is to “describe the law, without 
offering prescriptions.”290 The general steps taken for both types of research are laid out 
in this appendix, and then the explicit steps taken in this research are identified. 
The purpose of this research was to explore the legal issue proposed by Gage, 
Collins and Boyd regarding the application of section 7 to the environment and provide a 
neutral review of the law as it relates to that issue. It is not a reformist or prescriptive 
piece, but provides a legal opinion as to the requirements for successful litigation. Only 
                                                
287 Charter, supra note 9 Part I.  
288 Re: Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 SCR 721. 
289 S L Simons, "Navigating through the Fog: Teaching Legal Research and Writing Students to Master 
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case law from Canadian courts related to section 7 and how the provision might apply to 
environmental were analyzed. While the use of international may offer further insight in 
potential interpretations of section 7 given that, as mentioned by Boyd, multiple 
jurisdictions have considered similar environmental approaches to human rights 
legislation, a comparative approach was not taken. The complexity of international and 
the wide breadth of relevant case law from non-Canadian jurisdictions related to 
environmental rights renders such a comparative approach beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
The following is an outline of the three phases of legal research that were 
undertaken for this thesis: i) defining the problem, ii) the library or research phase, and 
iii) application or analysis phase.291  
Identifying the issue 
The first phase of legal research involves defining the problem the issue. 292 With 
practical legal research, the issue identified through fact gathering. The facts provide the 
context, and “dictate[s] the issues of law that need researching.”293 Fact-gathering 
processes may include interviewing clients and/or witnesses, reviewing documents, such 
as medical records, policy records, receipts, leases, contracts, tax returns, etc, consulting 
experts, and/or inspecting tangible evidence, such as murder weapons, fingerprints, 
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16 [Wren & Wren: Teaching]. 
 133 
articles of clothing, or any objects ceased in investigations.294 After gathering and 
analyzing the facts, the researcher must identify the legal issues raised by the facts.295  
For this work, the legal issue that formed the subject of this thesis had already 
been identified. Collins, Boyd, and Gage noted that the application of section 7 to an 
environmental context was an unexplored legal issue.296 As noted in Chapter 2, the 
bibliographies contained in the works of authors were consulted, as well as bibliographies 
of works citing Collins, Gage, and Boyd. Online searches of journals, library databases, 
and general research databases that used key search terms such as Charter, security of the 
person, fundamental justice, and environment were performed to determine whether or 
not additional work had written on the topic of environmental rights and section 7. The 
searches yielded no other results, indicating that the application of section 7 to the 
environment had not yet been answered. The issue, then, is whether section 7 could apply 
to an environmental setting. 
Library Phase 
After identifying the legal issue, a legal framework must be developed. The legal 
framework is developed in phase two of legal research, the Library Phase. The 
framework sets out the legal tests applicable to the issues identified in Phase I. There are 
three steps to the Library Phase: a) find the law, b) read the law, and, c) note-up the 
law.297   
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a) Locate the relevant sources of law 
In the first step, the researcher must locate the relevant sources of law. There are two 
sources of law: primary and secondary. Primary sources contain binding sources of law, 
whereas secondary sources summarize or analyze the law.298 Primary sources “cannot, in 
themselves, provide a complete statement of the law in any given situation.”299 Thus, 
secondary sources of law ought to be consulted before primary sources when conducting 
legal research.300  
Secondary sources do not constitute enforceable statements of law. 301 Instead, 
they provide the researcher with an overview of the applicable legal landscape and “assist 
the [researcher] in… explaining and understanding the law.”302 Secondary sources also 
often identify the relevant primary sources.303 Examples include the Canadian 
Abridgement, which is “a comprehensive collection of case digests, or summaries, of 
issues decided by Canadian courts and administrative tribunals”304 and Canada’s official 
method of organizing case law305, peer-reviewed journal articles, textbooks, treatises, 
case books, dictionaries, journals, periodicals, government documents, case 
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commentaries, and other lawyers, colleagues, or professors. A wide variety of secondary 
sources were consulted for this thesis, including all of the above. 
This work draws upon three broader areas of law: constitutional, administrative, 
and environmental (recognizing that environmental law encompasses multiple areas of 
law in itself). The key topics pursued in secondary sources were environmental law, 
environmental rights, procedural fairness, administrative law, the Charter and the 
Principles of Fundamental Justice.  
In addition to providing an overview of the law, secondary sources often identify 
the relevant primary sources of law.  
Primary sources of law 
Canada has a common law legal system, and thus has two primary sources of law: case 
law and legislation.306 Canadian case law consists of written decisions from judges (i.e., 
judgments) from all levels of Canadian courts.307 Thus, case law “cannot be found in any 
code or body of legislation, but exists only in past decisions.”308 All case law is printed at 
end of the Canadian Abridgement or can be searched through electronic legal databases, 
such as LexisNexis, CanLii, or Westlaw.  
The Canadian common law system is rooted in the principle of stare decisis, 
which requires judges to “follow the previous rulings (i.e. precedents) of other judges in 
higher courts in their province or territory and the Supreme Court of Canada on the same 
issue.”309 However, the common law is also “flexible and adaptable to changing 
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circumstances.”310 As new issues are presented at court, existing legal tests may need to 
be altered or expanded upon.  
Example: if the Supreme Court of Canada states that a trespass constitutes a 
direct and intentional interference with an individual’s land, this statement 
becomes the legal test for trespass in Canada.  This test can be broken down into 
four elements: a) a direct b) and intentional c) interference d) with land.  Assume 
that for several years, the only cases of trespass to come before courts involved a 
person entering someone else’s land, which fulfills the “direct” element of the 
test.  However, a judgment from the Ontario Court of Appeal later rules that a 
fallen tree on another’s land constitutes a “direct” interference.  Thus, in Ontario, 
the “direct” element is now fulfilled by a person on the land, or by an object on 
the land.  
 
Legislation, the second primary source of law, is law that is “made by elected 
representatives from any level of government” 311 and is used to “introduce a new law or 
to change or clarify existing laws.”312 There are three types of legislation in Canada: 
statues, regulations, and by-laws. Statutes are enacted at either the federal or provincial 
level, and are debated and voted on by elected representatives before coming into force. 
They contain broader rules that govern a particular area. Regulations and by-laws are 
enacted by ministers or administrative bodies, and provide the details that “operationalize 
and allow for implementation of the statute.”313 Every jurisdiction is required to publish 
full-text legislation online. 
For this thesis, the relevant case law includes all cases where section 7 claims 
relating to the environment were brought before any Canadian court; all cases from the 
Supreme Court of Canada that discuss the application of section 7, and administrative law 
cases from the Supreme Court of Canada addressing the duty of fairness, procedural 
                                                
310 Department of Justice, Canada, "About Canada's System of Justice" (2013), online: Department of 
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fairness, and the application of section 7 to administrative decisions. This case law was 
later accessed through LexisNexis and CanLii.  
Given that this work constitutes a Charter analysis, the Charter is the most 
significant piece of legislation referred to in this work. Each step of the legal framework 
is rooted in a provision of the Charter: s. 1, section 7, s. 32(1), s. 24(1), and s. 52.  
b) Reading and Evaluation 
The second step of the Library Phase involves reading and evaluating the law, and 
confirming that the identified legal tests apply to the issue by “plac[ing] authorities in 
their broader legal context.”314 Generally, this involves consulting the secondary sources 
identified in Phase I to obtain an understanding of the broader legal context, and then 
analyze the primary sources to confirm their particular relevance to the issue. It is always 
the duty of the legal researcher to read and evaluate the primary sources, and not to rely 
on the interpretations provided in secondary sources.315 The number of sources to be 
consulted will depend the complexity of the issue(s). 
Binding sources of law must be distinguished from persuasive sources of law. 
Binding sources must be followed, whereas persuasive sources may be considered, but 
courts are not obligated to apply them.316 Only primary sources have the capacity to be 
binding, but not all primary sources are binding in every circumstance.   
Legislation is always binding within its applicable jurisdiction. For example, 
federal legislation is binding across Canada, provincial legislation and regulations are 
binding within the province, and by-laws are binding within a municipality. In regards to 
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case law, there is a hierarchy among Canadian Courts (see figure 1), meaning that 
decisions from higher level courts bind lower level courts. Courts are also bound by their 
own judgments until they are overruled by a higher-level court within the same province, 
or by the Supreme Court of Canada. For example, decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Canada are binding across Canada,317 and judgments from higher-level provincial courts 
(e.g., the Ontario Court of Appeal) are binding on lower-level provincial courts (e.g., the 
Ontario Supreme Court of Justice) within the same province.318  
Persuasive sources of law include legislation and case law from other jurisdictions 
(e.g.: outside provinces, territories, or other countries), and secondary sources of law.  
Persuasive sources will not necessarily be applied, but may help strengthen an argument 
by illustrating how the law has been interpreted and/or developed by academics or by 
lawmakers in other jurisdictions. For example, legislation from other jurisdictions may be 
persuasive, but not binding. For example, Ontario’s Environmental Assessment Act319 
may be used to interpret British Columbia’s Environmental Assessment Act320 if there are 
similarly worded provisions. Similarly, judgments from the Ontario Court of Appeal are 
often considered to be strongly persuasive on the British Columbia Provincial Court or 
Court of Appeal. 
To the greatest extent possible, arguments should be based in binding sources of 
law.321 However, if no binding primary source of law exists for a particular point, citing 
the most relevant persuasive sources may be useful.  
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c) Noting-up 
The final step of the Library Phase is to ensure that any case law used in the framework is 
still good law. This is done through a process called noting-up.322 Noting-up involves 
checking for judicial treatment of a case; i.e., whether the case has been cited in 
subsequent judgments, and, if so, how the case was treated within those judgments. 323  
Positive treatment in subsequent cases (i.e., the judge followed the original logic of the 
case) indicates that the case is still good law and reinforces its strength. Negative 
treatment (i.e., the case was criticized or overruled)324 indicates that the case is no longer 
applicable, either in whole or in part. Negative treatment by a court within another 
jurisdiction does not overrule a case, but weakens its ability to be persuasive. 
The two tools most commonly used for noting up case law are electronic legal 
databases and the Canadian Abridgement. LexisNexis was the primary tool used for 
noting up for this research. All databases include an option to note up a case, which 
provides a list of case law that has cited the case within the body of the decision. Most 
databases also indicate positive or negative treatment. The Abridgement includes a 
“Consolidated Table of Cases”, which provides the history of every case, including 
“subsequent decisions, developments in the case, and any judicial treatments the case 
received in another decision.”325  
Application 
Finally, the researcher must analyze the issue as applied to the legal framework and form 
a legal opinion. A written opinion should then set out the legal framework, and an 
                                                
322 University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, supra note 304 at 1.10. 
323 University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, supra note 304 at 1.10. 
324 University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, supra note 304 at 1.10. 
325 University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, supra note 304 at 1.11. 
 140 
application of the law to the issue, and come to a clear, objective, and logical conclusion. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis contains the legal framework for section 7 and any environmental 
implications presented by the case law. Chapter 5 provides a hypothetical application of 
section 7 to environmental regulatory approval processes.  
 
 
